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# Foreword

*R. J. F. Boyer, President, Commonwealth Council of  
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Since the stirring of world events of the last few years, it has become a commonplace to say that international affairs have ceased to be the sole preserve of foreign offices and specially trained diplomats, and have become not only the concern but the responsibility of the people of the world, and most directly of the people of the democracies. Public opinion in democratic procedure finds its way inevitably and powerfully into the conduct of foreign affairs, however closely foreign policy may be handled in practice through expert and departmental personnel. Since war has become total, the conditions and influences which lead to its making and unmaking have passed forever from the narrow circles of the world's chancelleries, and we are seeing day by day the growing impact of public opinion upon history-making decisions. While this development can be welcomed as marking the end of a period in which sacrifices have been demanded of peoples who had little or no influence or responsibility in the events or decisions leading to such demands, it is impossible to deny the dangers and risks which are inherent in such a situation where the general public is wrongly or inadequately informed. Granted even that the democratic proposition that the instincts of the people will, on an average, be sounder than the instincts of an absolute ruler or oligarchy, it still remains true that a sound judgment requires adequate and reliable data as well as goodwill and noble intentions. The problem, therefore, of the world's progress in international amity and co-operation is not only one of administrative machinery and of vision in high places, but demands that we tread the long hard road of public education to fit the common man for his new and terrifying responsibilities. None of us can avoid making judgments on current international affairs, nor, indeed, can we evade exerting our influence through our governmental representative. The temptation to assume this responsibility lightly and to regard international affairs as capable of slick and snap judgments, is very strong. If we are to make the leadership of the democracies effective, and to arm our governments with adequate support for wise and noble policies, it is important that we recognise that international affairs are enormously

involved and require more than passing thought for adequate judgment.

It is to aid this objective that the Institute of International Affairs was originally brought into being, when it became apparent after the peace negotiations of 1919-1920 that much more public appreciation of world issues was required before ever real progress could be made. We are now in a similar and even more urgent position than at that period. The well-being or destruction of civilisation rests precariously upon the ebb and flow of opinion and attitude among peoples torn with passion and prejudice, and with very ill-equipped knowledge. No nation is exempt from this criticism and our situation will continue to be precarious until the sympathetic and serious study on a world scale of human relationships—political, social and economic—has become the constant concern of a much wider proportion of the world's peoples than is at present the case.

It is for this purpose, as well as to serve its own membership, that the Commonwealth Council of the Australian Institute of International Affairs has decided to launch this journal. The Institute, it is true, is by nature a learned society, but that does not mean that it aims only to further the information of its members for the purpose of satisfying the curiosity and interest of an academic and dilettante group within the community. The day is long past when the issues covered by the Institute are matters of intellectual and group concern only. The Institute is designed to leave its mark to some good purpose on the actual turn of events. It does so not by espousing any policy—indeed, it is strictly prevented by its constitution from endorsing or propagating any point of view. It does aim, however, to strike firmly at the heart of the problem by setting up means whereby research into international issues may be carried out and information of a factual nature may be disseminated, and also to act as a forum wherein those competent not only to give information but to express views may do so without any limitation and without unwanted publicity. In pursuance of this object, the Institute has felt that it would be of great value not only to our members but to the general public if some of the contributions made through the Institute could be incorporated in a quarterly journal, rather than confined to Institute meetings or to occasional pamphlets. Hitherto we have been the recipients of such journals from overseas—notably "International Affairs," the journal of the Royal Institute, and "International Journal," the journal of the Canadian Institute. The time has come, we feel, for a similar activity and contribution on our part. Much excellent material of engrossing interest to our members and the general public is available, both

from our own members and from outside sources, and there will be no dearth of interest and profit in "The Australian Outlook." The Council feels, too, that this journal will act as a unifying influence among our widely separated branches, giving us a cohesion which is difficult to achieve by other means. I commend the journal to all our members and to anyone and everyone who feels his or her responsibility in the stirring decisions which will be before us for many years.

Australia's influence is, and must be, more than commensurate with the size of her population, and it is urgent that that influence should be wisely and nobly exerted.

# The South Seas Conference, 1947

*T. P. Fry*

The South Seas Conference assembled in Canberra on January 28th, 1947, and drew up an Agreement which was signed on February 6th, 1947. When this Agreement between Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States is ratified by the participating Governments, it will bring into existence a South Pacific Commission controlling a Secretariat and a Research Council. The Commission is under an obligation to convene a series of South Pacific Conferences, the first to be held within two years after the Agreement comes into force. Subsequent Conferences are to be held at intervals not exceeding three years.

The stated objective of the Agreement is "to encourage and strengthen international co-operation in promoting the economic and social welfare and development of the peoples of the non-self-governing Territories in the South Pacific region administered by them." These international institutions have no political power: their functions are consultative and advisory only. Indeed, the principal function of the Research Council and the South Pacific Conferences alike is to act as an advisory body to the Commission, which itself is advisory in its nature. In the list of fields of investigation and research, the subjects most closely approximating to the field of politics are social welfare, trade and finance, and industry.

## The Commission has been established

- (i) to study, formulate and recommend measures for the development of, and where necessary the co-ordination of services affecting, the economic and social rights and welfare of the inhabitants of the territories within the scope of the Commission, particularly in respect of agriculture (including animal husbandry), communications, transport, fisheries, forestry, industry, labour, marketing, production, trade and finance, public works, education, health, housing and social welfare.
- (ii) to provide for and facilitate research in technical, scientific, economic and social fields in the territories within the scope of the Commission and to ensure the maximum co-operation and co-ordination of the activities of research bodies;
- (iii) to provide technical assistance, advice and information (including statistical and other material) for the participating Governments.

Whilst the functions of the Commission are to be consultative and advisory, it nevertheless is to have all the executive and administrative powers necessary to enable it to make investigations incidental to the proper performance of its consultative and advisory functions. Its Secretariat and Research Council will therefore be of considerable importance to the effective performance of the Commission's functions. The Secretariat will be headed by a Secretary-General who will be the Commission's Chief administrative officer. The Deputy Chairman of the Research Council is to be a member of the Secretariat. In administrative matters he is to be responsible to the Secretary-General, although he himself is to be directly responsible to the Commission in respect of his primary function of supervising the execution of the programme of the Research Council. His authority in all technical research matters (as distinguished from administrative matters) is further emphasised by the fact that in respect of such matters all full-time members of the Research Council come under his direction and control.

The relationship of members of the Research Council to the Commission and to the Secretariat is rather complicated in character. The Research Council is to consist only partly of full-time members. The Agreement provides that:

The Commission shall appoint, as members of the Research Council, such persons distinguished in the fields of research within the competence of the Commission as it considers necessary for the discharge of the Council's functions. Among the members of the Council so appointed there shall be a small number of persons highly qualified in the several fields of health, economic development and social development who shall devote their full time to the work of the Research Council.

The Research Council may possibly not itself employ a large number of research workers on its staff working under its direct supervision and control. This is apparent from the Agreement, which states that the functions of the Research Council shall be:

- (a) to maintain a continuous survey of research needs in the territories within the scope of the Commission and to make recommendations to the Commission on research to be undertaken;
- (b) to arrange, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, for the carrying out of the research studies approved by the Commission, using existing institutions where appropriate and feasible;
- (c) to co-ordinate the research activities of other bodies working within the field of the Commission's activities and, where possible, to avail itself of the assistance of such bodies;
- (d) to appoint technical standing research committees to consider problems in particular fields of research;
- (e) to appoint, with the approval of the Commission, *ad hoc* research committees to deal with special problems;
- (f) to make to each session of the Commission a report of its activities.

The Research Council is merely an auxiliary body of the Commission, but it is a very important one, which has been established "in view of the special importance of research for the carrying out of the purposes of the Commission."

Great importance was attached, especially by the U.S. delegation, to the holding of periodical South Pacific Conferences under the aegis of the Commission. The Commission is to comprise Controlling Powers only, whereas the Conferences are to comprise representatives from each of the non-self-governing Territories in the South Pacific. Thus, the following non-self-governing Territories will probably be represented at the Conferences: the Territory of Papua-New Guinea, the Territory of Norfolk Island, the Colony of Fiji, the Colony of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, the Pitcairn Islands District, New Caledonia, French Oceania, American Samoa, the Cook Islands, the Territory of Western Samoa, the Tokelau Islands, and Eastern Indonesia (in which Netherlands New Guinea is to be incorporated). It will be the duty of the Commission to determine which Territories are to be represented and the maximum number of delegates to be sent by each Territory. The Commission will probably exercise its discretion to give a major Territory like Fiji or Papua-New Guinea a greater representation than it will give a somewhat unimportant Territory such as the Pitcairn Islands District.

The precise size of the various delegations to the periodical Conferences is not of any considerable importance, because the Conferences are designed primarily to enable representatives of local communities and local Territory administrations to voice their views concerning "such matters of common interest as fall within the competence of the Commission." No such Conference will have any executive or administrative function and at most it will make recommendations to the Commission. The Agreement states that the objects of these periodical Conferences is "to associate with the work of the Commission representatives of the local inhabitants of, and of official and non-official institutions directly concerned with, the Territories within the scope of the Commission." In order to assist in achieving this object, the Agreement further provides that, "delegates shall be selected in such manner as to ensure the greatest possible measure of representation of the local inhabitants of the Territory," and that the delegation from each Territory "may include alternative delegates and as many advisers as the appointing authority considers necessary."

The exact relationship of the Kingdom of Tonga to the work of the Commission, and particularly to the proposed periodical Con-

ferences, was complicated by the long-standing diplomatic disagreement between the United Kingdom and the United States as to the precise international status of Tonga. It is a Protectorate of the United Kingdom which enjoys a very considerable measure of self-government, but the United States refuses to recognise the United Kingdom as the Protecting Power. At the Canberra Conference the difficulty was surmounted by a resolution, moved by the United Kingdom delegation, to the effect that "the South Seas Conference expresses its hope that the co-operation of the Kingdom of Tonga may be enlisted in appropriate activities of the proposed South Pacific Commission."

Most of the detailed provisions concerning the structure and procedure of the Commission itself are to be formulated in regulations to be promulgated by the Commission. The Agreement itself, however, provides that each of the six participating Governments may appoint a Senior Commissioner and one other Commissioner, together with such alternates and advisers as it considers desirable for the purpose of assisting its two Commissioners. The Canberra Conference passed a resolution expressing its hope "that, in designating Commissioners to the proposed South Pacific Commission, each participating Government will designate as one of its Commissioners a person whose services to the fullest extent possible will be made available for work and activities in connection with the Commission throughout the year." Each participating Government is to have only one vote on the Commission. Decisions of the Commission require the concurring votes of two-thirds of all the Senior Commissioners, except that "decisions on budgetary or financial matters which may involve a financial contribution by the participating Governments (other than a decision to adopt the annual administrative budget of the Commission), shall require the concurring votes of all the Senior Commissioners."

All the expenses of the Commission, the Research Council and the Conferences are to be met out of the funds of the Commission, except that the salaries and other expenditures of the Commissioners and their immediate staffs are to be determined and paid by the respective Governments appointing them. An initial working fund of £40,000 sterling is to be provided, pending a decision by the Commission as to the annual expenditure which it proposes to incur. The contributions to the initial working fund and to the subsequent annual funds of the Commission are to be determined in accordance with the following percentages: Australia, 30%; France, 12½%; the Netherlands, 15%; New Zealand, 15%; the United Kingdom, 15%; the United States of America, 12½%.

The permanent headquarters of the Commission and of its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies are to be located at a place, in one of the non-self-governing Territories of the South Pacific, to be selected by the Commission within six months after the Agreement comes into force. Pending the establishment of its permanent headquarters, it is to have its temporary headquarters in Sydney. There was a considerable body of opinion at the Canberra Conference in favour of Suva as the site of the permanent headquarters, and Port Moresby was also mentioned; but the actual choice has been left to the Commission. It is not to be on the Australian or New Zealand mainland.

The non-self-governing Territories comprised within the territorial scope of the Commission will include colonies, protectorates, trust territories and one mandated territory (Nauru). The trust territories of Western Samoa and Papua-New Guinea also come under the jurisdiction of the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. As a consequence, Australia and New Zealand respectively are responsible to the Trusteeship Council in respect of these trust territories, but not in respect of their other dependencies in the South Pacific; and the Trusteeship Council has no jurisdiction in respect of the dependencies of the other four participating Governments. It is important to realise, therefore, that there will be no organic connection between the South Pacific Commission (or its Research Council or its Conferences) and the Trusteeship Council (or other institutions) of the United Nations. The South Pacific Commission will not be an agency of the United Nations. Despite this, the Agreement makes provision for the Commission to "co-operate as fully as possible with the United Nations and with appropriate specialised agencies on matters of mutual concern within the competence of the Commission."

The Agreement authorises the establishment of international machinery, but the leaders of each of the delegations at the Canberra Conference emphasised the fact that whether the machinery does or does not work effectively will depend upon whether the participating Governments do or do not make a determined endeavour to utilize the machinery. Australia and New Zealand were authorised to commence immediately the task of making preliminary arrangements for the first meeting of the Commission, even although the Agreement may not be ratified and come into force for several months to come. Arrangements have already been made for appropriate personnel to perform these preliminary duties.

# Regionalism in the South Seas

*John Andrews*

The establishment of the South Pacific Commission marks a stage in the development of colonial policy in the Pacific. The success or failure of the Commission will depend partly on the amount of support given it by the participating Governments—an unpredictable factor in these days of rapidly changing issues and power groupings—and on the calibre and efficiency of the permanent staff; but it also depends on the validity or otherwise of certain basic assumptions on which the concept of a regional organisation is erected.

One such assumption is that the area covered by the Commission's activities constitutes a "region" and has "regional" cohesion. The political geographer means by the term "region" an area in which is present, and which is characterised by, a well-defined assemblage of common politico-geographical features and problems. It is the "commonness" of these features and problems which gives the region cohesion, and it is changes in their characteristic assemblage around the periphery which set the limits of the region. However academic this may sound, it is probably what most politicians have in mind when they use the words "region" and "regional", even when they approach the matter by way of particular issues rather than by theoretical concepts. And when one begins to talk in terms of "regional" organisation, such a definition must be assumed, and the assumption must be made that the area in question does possess a "regional" character, or the discussion loses all reality. If the South Pacific is not in fact a region with a large assemblage of common features, interests and problems, then it is difficult to imagine what work the Commission can do and what form collaboration by Governments can take. It may, therefore, be worth while to consider this matter of regionalism in the South Pacific.

A further assumption on which the argument for a regional Commission rests is that many of the problems facing Governments in the area can best be dealt with by concerted and collaborative effort. This is taken for granted by many, probably in the belief that the bigger the organisation the better the work it can do, but this is not necessarily true. To be thoroughly convincing, the argu-

ment should show that a large number of problems cannot be satisfactorily attacked without such combined effort, that the very nature of the problems requires a regional approach rather than a local. This is not only a question of the pooling of resources—including wisdom—but of a different scientific method.

The area to be covered by the Commission extends from (and includes Dutch New Guinea) eastwards and south of the equator to the eastern boundary of French Oceania. Within it, so far as physical features are concerned, there is a high degree of regional uniformity. It is an island world, the vast proportion of the islands are very small, and even in the largest no individual dwells more than 100 miles distant from the sea. Somewhat paradoxically, then, it is the ocean which gives character to the region. Because of its omnipresent and moderating influence and because of the fragmented land surface, climates are remarkably uniform throughout, and this has important results in the fields of human health and comfort and of subsistence and commercial agriculture. The great expanse of the ocean and the consequent distance between island groups may indeed be regarded in one sense as a factor working against regional cohesion, but, much more importantly, it is this very factor which forms the common element in many administrative and economic problems. The Gilbert and Ellice Groups, for instance, number some 25 islands, with a total land surface of less than 200 square miles, but they are strewn over a thousand-mile long zone of ocean; the islands of the Tuamotu Archipelago number 77 but total only 300 square miles and stretch over a thousand miles of ocean. The necessity for and the relative slowness of water transport add to the difficulties of maintaining administrative services and contact under these conditions and, on the economic side, to the difficulty of competing numerically with more compact areas elsewhere. The introduction of air transport does not really lessen the difficulties, though it does certainly lift them to the level of a truly regional problem.

It is customary to divide the islands themselves into two main groups, the low coral atolls and the high islands. The latter may be subdivided into the "continental" and the "oceanic" islands, the most important difference between the two, so far as human life is concerned, being that it is geologically possible for the former to contain deposits of mineral fuels and industrial minerals, while the latter are unlikely to contain any commercial deposits other than gold and phosphate rock. Of the two main groups, the atolls, being composed almost exclusively of limestone, have little variety of soil, and very often are of low fertility; their vegetation is restricted to a few specially adaptable plants such as the coconut and the pandanus. The high islands, on the other hand, usually have a much

greater variety of rocks and therefore of soil types; unless rainfall is deficient they carry a luxuriant vegetation of a great variety of species, and the possibilities in commercial agriculture are immensely greater. Sedimentary rocks in the "continental" islands may, it is true, give soils of fertility lower than that of any soils to be found in exclusively volcanic oceanic islands. The point to be made here, however, is that these two or three types of islands are the only major landform types in the South Pacific, so that in this respect there is a very high degree of regional uniformity and, since most of the national units contain islands of both types, any problems which flow from their physical nature are common to the whole region.

These physiographic and climatic similarities are particularly significant in the economic field—the business of getting a living from the land. Fundamentally similar food-producing techniques are to be found throughout: garden cultivation (rather than field agriculture) on cleared forest land, fishing by coastal and riverine peoples, some collection of wild forest products, the semi-domestication of pigs and poultry, and perhaps the hunting of small animals. Only among a few communities are the gardens permanent; elsewhere there is a more or less frequent shifting to new and abandonment of old gardens. The basic food crops are tubers and tree crops, while the grains, except perhaps for maize, are cultivated only in special circumstances. The plough is used by very few of the natives, and irrigation is rare. In some areas, as in parts of the Sepik and Fly flood plains, practically no cultivation is undertaken at all and the diet is one of sago (collected from wild palms) and fish; on some of the poorer atolls the coconut provides the main element of diet, with fish as the chief support; in the upper Wahgi valley of the Central Highlands of New Guinea, a very wide variety of crops is grown on terraced and drained fields under an efficient rotation. Yet all these local variations fit without undue strain into a general regional pattern of garden cultivation.

Now, in the wet tropics most of the soils, contrary to common opinion, are not particularly fertile. The exceptions to this general rule are to be found in the flood plains of rivers where there is a periodic distribution of silt brought from the higher country, or in the vicinity of active volcanoes which provide a periodic distribution of volcanic dust. Elsewhere, the heavy rains wash out much of the soluble mineral plant-food. In addition, there is little accumulation of humus because the high temperatures encourage its rapid decomposition. The luxuriant vegetation of the rain forests is not an indication of high fertility; they exist because of the abundance of heat, water and sunlight and because, while there is

no accumulation of humus, there is always a sufficient mass of dead vegetation to provide the essential food for the living. But when the forest is removed to make way for cultivated crops, the very delicate balance is disturbed; the crop is not nearly so luxuriant in growth as the original forest and does not offer the soil the same protection from erosion and from rapid removal of soluble soil constituents; there is not the same mass of plant remains, particularly as some part of the crop is removed by harvesting and therefore there will be more or less speedy decline in the amount of humus. These are the reasons for the practice of "shifting cultivation"; it is not necessarily a primitive and wasteful practice, but simply a logical response, in terms of native techniques, to the prevailing natural conditions.

Obviously this practice demands a high ratio of land per head of population. A continued increase of population would eventually bring trouble, because the gardens would be re-cleared and replanted too often after abandonment to allow them to regain some of their lost fertility; there would be declining yields and sooner or later food shortages and malnutrition. The only solution to the problem is the adoption of improved techniques which would allow the fixation of cultivation, the continued planting of the same garden areas, so that much more of the possible garden areas are available to the community at any one time. But just what these techniques are remains to be discovered, proved and adopted. There is an enormous amount of work to be done in examining the soils and the soil processes of these islands, in studying the relations between population density and food supply, the dietary needs of the people, and in discovering new cultivation techniques which will increase yields, give a more balanced diet and yet preserve maximum soil fertility. When all this is done, there begins the work of educating the natives to adopt the new practices and to abandon the old —no easy task because the latter are usually an integral part of social and religious life. Any policy of social betterment is only likely to be successful if the basic relationships between the people and their land are properly organised. This is such a vast field of research, and the research facilities of the various administrations are so limited, that collaboration in the exchange of information and the co-ordination of research programmes is obviously highly desirable and can do nothing but good.

These considerations apply equally to commercial agriculture. The principle of trusteeship should cover not only the peoples but also the soil resources. That means we have to understand the soils and how best to manage them under conditions of commercial planting; it also means that there must be an integrated land policy

to keep the balance between commercial and subsistence requirements. Detailed local studies will be needed to determine how much and what type of land is available for the two purposes, but policy should come from the summation of such studies, and here again the international exchange of experience and results would be invaluable.

For commercial production there is not a very wide range of possibilities, partly for environmental reasons, partly because of market opportunities. Market research should be particularly valuable for these communities which produce for distant consumers and have little control over the economic conditions of price and demand. One difficulty in stimulating and maintaining native interest in commercial production is the fluctuation in price level for his products, which, governed as it is by conditions quite outside his ken, appears arbitrary and suspicious. This is a problem of truly regional significance and it may well be thought desirable to consider the possibility of establishing some joint marketing organisation and method of price stabilisation for the main products of the region. This raises in turn the whole question of the economic education of peoples whose concepts differ so markedly from those of the world which is ever pressing closer to them.

I have dealt at length with problems of the physical environment and of its use by the native peoples, partly from personal interest, partly because this aspect has not received so much attention in discussions elsewhere. But regionalism can be and, I believe, is just as marked in the social environment, particularly in the fields of labour, health and education. In the first of these there is a generally comparable level of skill and aptitudes throughout the region so far as the indigenous peoples are concerned, but considerable differences in labour policy and legislation. Uniformity in all details is neither necessary nor likely, and there may well be insurmountable obstacles to the achievement of any real collaboration. But native interests are very definitely involved in certain major issues and can hardly be adequately served in the long run without a regional approach. Such matters are the migration to or within the region of non-indigenous labour, the effect on the native social structures of recruitment for labour away from home, relations between native and non-native labour, training for skilled occupations, and others.

In regard to health the chances of effective collaboration are greater, perhaps because there is not the conflict of economic interests. There is certainly regional character in regard to disease; with the exception of malaria and scrub typhus, which are confined to the north-western part of the area, there is a common suite of

maladies, each of which is found universally in aetologically favourable situations. Many of them are easily communicable, so that their successful control calls for common measures unless artificial barriers to contact between peoples are to be erected. Yaws, dysentery, hookworm, filariasis and TB do not respect international frontiers.

The educational field, perhaps, offers least opportunities for work at the regional level, but it should be remembered that it is largely occupied at present by a number of missionary bodies, many of which have themselves a regional organisation. If the Commission could do no more than stimulate some co-ordination of aims and policy by these bodies at the top level, it would have been worth while.

The work to be done in these social fields has been described sufficiently frequently to make further elaboration of the argument unnecessary. Perhaps enough has been said in this brief sketch to indicate that there is indeed a well-defined regional character in this tropical, oceanic-insular, far-flung, humid realm. There are problems enough, too, even in the narrow field of the Commission's interest—problems of land development and conservation, of the introduction of commercial production and its effect on the traditional native economies, of labour, health, and the rest—which, while not everywhere identical, are sufficiently common throughout. Had the Commission been empowered to consider political issues, the unity of the region would have been even more apparent; if collaboration on these issues follows, as it well may, that will be the final proof.

# **Collaboration for Welfare in the South-West Pacific**

**J. M. Ward**

Regional co-operation of Powers sharing the administration of single areas has become increasingly common under modern conditions of war, trade and communications. Political divisions, which had previously not obstructed administration, are now found to be obstacles to efficient planning of defence and trade. Regional organisation can sometimes offer advantages where commercial, social and economic problems transcend political boundaries.

At the Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in December, 1942, Lord Hailey suggested that a regional council, representing administering Powers and colonial peoples, might be established for the Pacific. Later, General Smuts elaborated the regional council principle with special reference to colonies. It was thought that, where several Powers share the administration of colonial territories in a region exhibiting similar problems, good administration, effective development and successful welfare policies, would all stand to benefit from collaboration amongst the ruling Powers.

The British Government supported the regional council principle in July, 1943, partly in answer to United States criticism of British "Imperialism." Later there was considerable disputation in the British and American Press as to the relation between proposed regional organisation and the trusteeship principle. Organisation of regional councils for colonial territories was correlated by some American observers with suggestions that Great Britain should relinquish part of her colonies. With the swing of the pendulum away from opinion favouring increased international control of colonies, however, the regional council scheme began to drop out of plans for colonial administration.

One instance in which the principle of regional collaboration amongst colonial Powers has come to fruition is the establishment of the South Pacific Commission, which was set up as a result of the conference of British, American, French, Dutch, Australian and New Zealand representatives in Canberra a few weeks ago. The Commission is intended to promote collaboration in solving the

economic and social problems of colonial territories in the South-West Pacific. Direct interest in political and defence matters is expressly excluded from the Commission's purview. The intention is that the Commission will work at the level of research, advice and collaboration on general policy. The degree to which the Powers enter into its activities appears to be a matter for their own discretion, to be exercised from time to time.

## I.

Regional organisations like the Commission aim to represent common interests and deal with common problems. But each Power possesses in the region concerned very special interests of its own. Not all Powers will have an equal interest in promoting the work of the Commission. The initiative in establishing the South Pacific Commission was taken by Australia and New Zealand. In itself the lead given by the two Dominions to the United States and the United Kingdom is sufficiently remarkable to require comment. For what reasons did Australia and New Zealand press for the establishment of the Commission? Why did the other Powers acquiesce in their leadership?

The proposal for a South Pacific Commission emanated from the Australian and New Zealand Conference in Canberra in January, 1944. In the circumstances of the original proposal can be found two of the conceptions underlying the role of the Dominions in recommending its establishment. First, the Canberra Conference looked forward to the peace settlements and formulated the principle that the vital strategic interests of Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific warranted the fullest possible participation by those countries in the peace negotiations and future arrangements for the region. The determination of Australia and New Zealand to make their role in Pacific affairs a more active one was asserted in the strongest possible terms. Second, the Conference expressed the desire of both countries to see enlightened principles of colonial administration applied for the advancement of native welfare in all the South Pacific islands.

From the standpoint of regional collaboration in the South-West Pacific, the most important clauses in the Agreement were Numbers 13 and 28-31. Clause 13 dealt with the establishment of a "regional zone of defence comprising the South-West and South Pacific areas"; the zone was to be based on Australia and New Zealand. The suggestion for the establishment of a South Seas Regional Commission was made in Clauses 28-31, dealing with "Welfare and Advancement of Native Peoples of the Pacific." The Australian and New Zealand Governments, having declared that the principles

of the Atlantic Charter and of trusteeship should be applied to all colonial territories in the Pacific and elsewhere, went on to state that the welfare of native peoples in the Pacific colonies demanded "a greater measure of collaboration between the numerous authorities concerned in their control, and that such collaboration is particularly desirable in regard to health services and communications, matters of native education, anthropological investigation, assistance in native production and material development generally". Clause 30 declared the intention of the two Governments to promote the establishment of the regional commission, on which representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, France (then the French Committee of National Liberation), Australia and New Zealand might sit. (Holland was not included at this stage).

It will be noted that the establishment of the Commission was proposed at the Canberra Conference (and elaborated later at the Wellington Conference) which also produced assertions by Australia and New Zealand of their right to be given a more active role in Pacific affairs. Over and over again Australian and New Zealand spokesmen have laid it down as a principle too vital to be sacrificed that each Dominion needs and is entitled to the fullest possible share in policy making for the South-West Pacific. The suggestion for a South Seas Commission and the claim to be fully consulted in international agreements affecting the Pacific have common elements in the recognition that the island world is strategically and economically part of Australasia.

## II.

Looked at historically the Australian and New Zealand insistence on being accorded a special place in the South-West Pacific is seen to contain little that is new. Arguing from the most palpable facts of geography, Australian and New Zealand colonists of over a century ago recognised that they had a vested interest in bringing the islands under their own (or British) control. A not untypical and rather amusing instance of early colonial imperialism was provided by the "Sydney Gazette" in 1827. Although Australia was then little more than a penal colony, the "Gazette" protested against American encroachment upon "the innumerable isles that bespeak that ocean of which Australia is destined to hold the imperial sway." In the succeeding decades French, Russian, American and German activity in the islands provoked a fairly sustained demand from the Australian and New Zealand colonies for British annexations in the South Pacific.

British Governments did much to burn the consciousness of the island problem into Australian and New Zealand thinking by de-

clining to oppose foreign expansion in the islands and paying little heed to suggestions that the Empire should be extended in the South Seas. From the standpoint of the traders in Australia and New Zealand, who looked for the business gains which might have followed from having the islands under their control, the British policy was deplorable. Missionary interests, although not always seeking British annexation in the islands, deprecated the expansion of foreign rule, especially when sectarian issues developed. Enlisting the more aggressive nationalists on their side, and fortifying their cases by reference to the defence needs of Australia and New Zealand, these groups maintained constant pressure against the policy of the Mother Country. On at least one occasion New Zealand very nearly proceeded to annex Samoa in defiance of international law and settled British policy. In 1883 the Queensland Government raised the British flag in Eastern New Guinea, but the British authorities strongly condemned and disavowed the action.

Australian and New Zealand pleas for British annexations in Oceania remained an embarrassing, but not very potent, factor in the formulation of British policy until the partition of the important islands was complete. Some of the largest groups near Australia and New Zealand passed wholly or partly under foreign control, and in each country early criticisms of British policy were held to have been justified when the outbreak of war in 1914 found Germany, the principal enemy, on the doorstep. The German forces in North-East New Guinea and in Western Samoa were, however, readily overcome by Australian and New Zealand detachments.

The end of the war found the two Dominions determined not to surrender the territories which they had captured. In 1920 "C" class mandates were entrusted to Australia over former German New Guinea, and to New Zealand over Western Samoa. Australia and New Zealand shared with Great Britain the mandate over the phosphate rock of Nauru, which was placed under Australian administration.

By 1920 Australia and New Zealand had seen their fears regarding enemy use of the islands justified. They had, however, been given control of important territories. In addition to the mandates just mentioned, Australia had administered Papua from 1905, while the Cook Islands (together with Niue) had been under New Zealand control since 1901. In 1926 New Zealand received from Great Britain the control of the Tokelau (or Union Islands).

The old objective of a British Oceania had not been attained, but the position of Australia and New Zealand in relation to the islands had been internationally recognised. The Dominions had become

ruling states in the South Seas, and also had the satisfaction of seeing their late enemies in World War I cleared out of the Pacific. Their island trade was increasing. On every count their influence in island affairs was considerably increased.

### III.

Events between the two World Wars tended for the greater part of the period to re-orientate Australian and New Zealand interest in the islands. With the partition of the South-West Pacific almost complete, with the main island groups in friendly hands and with considerable territories of their own to administer, the Dominions gave more attention to colonial policy and development and less to politics and defence. The Washington Conference of 1921-22, leading to a joint agreement of the British Empire, the United States and Japan not to strengthen or extend fortifications in their insular Pacific possessions, seemed to justify some lessening of interest in the strategic potentialities of the island world. The Australian Prime Minister, Mr. W. M. Hughes, protested against the decision of the Washington Conference to preserve the *status quo* in Pacific island fortifications. Nevertheless, as the twenties went on, defence problems were allowed to slip into the background. Colonial policy and development engrossed most thinking on the island problem.

In both Australia and New Zealand public opinion began to take a pride in the development of humanitarian colonial policies. Colonial administration as undertaken by the two Dominions between wars was certainly less enterprising and less vigorous than some public spokesmen have been prepared to admit, but one substantial advance was made. As mandatories both Australia and New Zealand regarded themselves as young nations on test before the bar of world opinion. Their interest in the South Pacific islands extended beyond matters of defence and trade to the problems of good colonial administration. Similar trends (with somewhat different motivations) appeared in most of the other territories in the South Pacific, especially those under British or American control.

### IV.

The collapse of the Washington Naval Treaty in 1936, preceded by the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations, provided unmistakable evidence that the tempo of island affairs was changing. Even the news that the Japanese were fortifying their mandated islands did not bestir Australia, New Zealand or other administering states in the South-West Pacific to prepare to defend their island territories.

It was not until 1939, when aggression was clearly in the ascendant, that any of the Powers holding territory in the South Seas met openly to consider their common defence problems. In April, 1939, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the British South Seas Administrations met in New Zealand at a Pacific Defence Conference. Some of the rumours current about the Conference reported that British administrative defence problems in the South Pacific might be simplified by transferring some of the British-controlled islands to Australia or New Zealand. The Solomons were mentioned specially, as they formed part of the Australian defence system. Amongst the tangible results of the Conference were the despatch of a small Australian garrison to Papua and the construction of air bases and fortifications in some of the British islands.

War-time developments profoundly influenced the attitude of the administering states towards their South-West Pacific territories. Renewed interest in the strategic potentialities of the islands, the development of rivalry for the use of possible civil air bases and the enemy occupation of several islands reawakened the former interest in the political and defence disposition of South Seas territories. The behaviour of island peoples under invasion and threat of invasion drove home the lesson that an enlightened colonial policy was more than a liberal, humanitarian objective; it was a matter of plain self-interest. The development and protection of the islands and the welfare of their peoples came to be regarded during the war years as matters of vital concern to the administering Powers and of even more special interest to countries like Australia and New Zealand, whose most intimate strategic problems were closely bound up with the future of the island territories.

The war in the Pacific produced conditions favourable to colonial reform. Australia and New Zealand, like other ruling states, were constrained to overhaul their island policies fairly thoroughly. From the standpoint of the defence needs of the Dominions, it was obvious that past policy had been successful on only one point—the loyalty of the natives in most of the groups had been quite well maintained. From the standpoint of general administration, it was becoming increasingly obvious that the natives themselves had not always been adequately protected in their introduction to the "strenuous conditions of modern life," while at the same time insufficient development had left the islands nearly defenceless and made them stepping stones for aggression.

All colonial Powers were facing similar problems. Australia and New Zealand were given much cause for consideration by the passage of the British Colonial Welfare Act, 1940, the persistent attacks

in some American quarters on "imperialism" in all its forms, and the rapid upsurge of colonial nationalism, especially in the Netherlands East Indies. The great increase of liberal sentiment which found expression in the war-time statements of President Roosevelt, the Atlantic Charter and the Mutual Aid Agreements, led to conscientious attempts to apply liberal economic and social policies to colonial administration.

The prevailing sentiment in both Australia and New Zealand came to favour a very liberal form of trusteeship. Liberty to fortify colonial territories (including former mandates) was insisted upon, but, together with the furtherance of international peace and security, trusteeship would also provide for the promotion of the well-being of the inhabitants of trust territories. The espousal of trusteeship principles by Australia and New Zealand represented the merger of their main groups of interest in the South Pacific. Defence and native welfare, development and the political advancement of the native peoples had, in the South-West Pacific (as in most other colonial areas), come to be regarded as facets of the same policy.

## V.

How were these composite objectives of policy to be attained? Defence problems were beyond the capacity of Australia and New Zealand to handle. Without the active assistance of Great Powers no defence policy implemented by the Dominions in the South-West Pacific could hope to succeed. Moreover, it was inconceivable that the United States or Great Britain would overlook the strategic importance of South Seas territories after World War II as they had done after World War I. Defence was plainly a matter of joint interest in which neither Australia nor New Zealand was competent to take the initiative. Native welfare and economic policy, however, were very different matters. The Dominions together were amongst the most important administering Powers in the South Seas. Their policies had been commended by the Permanent Mandates Commission. During the war they had developed close relationships with the French colonies. They shared largely in island trade. In the economic and social aspects of island policy Australia and New Zealand had good grounds for taking the initiative.

At the Canberra Conference of 1944 policy was laid down on both defence and welfare matters. It was claimed that international arrangements for the future security of the South-West Pacific should be arrived at on the basis of discussion and consultation amongst all the Powers concerned. "These things should be determined," stated Dr. Evatt, "only after full prior consultation with

us."<sup>1</sup> In matters of welfare and development, Australia and New Zealand suggested the establishment of a South Seas Commission, on which all administering states would be represented and which would be charged with advising on economic and social policy. After the Wellington Conference in 1944 Dr. Evatt explained the proposal in these terms: "We endeavoured," he said, "to give a lead in this matter of regional collaboration by proposing in the Australia-New Zealand Agreement the establishment of a Commission to advise the various Governments responsible for territories in the Pacific Islands."<sup>2</sup>

Summing up policy as it appeared in the 1944 Conferences, it could be said that, on the main questions of security in the South-West Pacific, Australia and New Zealand claimed the right to be consulted as full partners in the defence of the region. On the closely allied questions of welfare and development the Dominions took the initiative on the grounds of geographical contiguity, the considerable area of the territories ruled by them and their close economic ties with the island world.

The initiative of Australia and New Zealand has proved acceptable to the Powers. The South Pacific Commission will operate over territories lying generally south of the Equator and eastwards from (and including) Dutch New Guinea as far as the French Establishment in Oceania. In carrying out its functions, which will be advisory, the Commission will attempt to bring together the ideas and experience of all those with first-hand knowledge of South Seas territories. The collaboration aimed at is designed to reflect the general realisation that, on defence, political, economic and social grounds, the discharge by a country of its obligations towards native peoples is a matter affecting all its neighbours. In the past the South Seas territories have exhibited marked discrepancies in the handling of native problems. Agreement on ultimate aims will assist in the co-ordination of present policies. A continuance of low standards in some territories can only make it harder for the general condition of island peoples to be improved. Only international collaboration can prevent waste in such matters as duplicated research, inefficient use of specialist services and sharing of expensive facilities.

## VI.

The establishment of the South Pacific Commission represents the convergence of five lines of historical development. The traditional claims of Australia and New Zealand to a special place in the South-

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1. Statement tabled in the Australian House of Representatives, 30 November, 1944.  
2. Ibid.

West Pacific, the growth of active foreign policy in the Dominions, the acceptance of trusteeship principles, the growing reliance on skilled professional services in dealing with native peoples and the realisation that defence, political and welfare problems are closely inter-related in the colonies, were all contributing factors in the formation of the Commission. There was also another factor, developing in the islands themselves, which needs to be taken into consideration. This was progress made in the years before the war towards the breaking down of administrative barriers and the co-ordinating of specialist services.

Six States rule the South Pacific Commission area. At the time when the Commission was proposed these six States maintained sixteen different administrative systems in the islands. Australia ruled the Territory of Papua and the Mandate of New Guinea and had a share in the Nauru Mandate (which was in fact administered by her). New Zealand ruled the Cook Islands, Niue and the Tokelauas as dependencies and Western Samoa as a mandate. The British island groups exhibited great diversity in political and constitutional status. Tonga was a highly developed independent kingdom under British protection. Fiji, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony and Pitcairn (with smaller islands) were Crown Colonies. The British Solomon Islands were a protectorate. The New Hebrides were an Anglo-French condominium and Canton and Enderbury were ruled by Great Britain and the United States. Some co-ordination was provided through the Western Pacific Commission, responsible for administration in all British islands except Fiji, which had its own governmental system (the Governor of Fiji being, however, High Commissioner of the Western Pacific), and also supervising British relations with Tonga. The French Colonies in the South Pacific were split into several different administrations. New Caledonia was a separate colony. The New Hebrides, as stated above, were an Anglo-French condominium. There were also the French Establishments in Oceania (comprising the Societies, Tuamotus, Marquesas, Australs and Gambiers) and the Protectorates of Wallis and Horne Islands. The United States ruled Eastern Samoa as territory under naval jurisdiction and shared in the condominium over Canton and Enderbury. Holland ruled Dutch New Guinea as part of the Netherlands East Indies.

The great diversity of political systems in the islands is to be attributed to the haphazard process by which they passed under foreign control. The continuance of cumbersome complexities, long after their origins had ceased to be important, reflects the great importance of distance and poor communications as factors opposing co-ordinated administration in the islands. Moreover,

policy in the past has rarely been energetic enough or planned on a wide enough scale to make the patch-work political system a serious embarrassment in administration.

From time to time tendencies of political co-ordination did appear and they were coming to a head just before the war. The most important trend towards unification was taking place in the British territories. The Reorganisation Report of the Western Pacific High Commission, prepared in 1937, emphasised the need for greater co-ordination in the services of Fiji and the High Commission area:

"Agreement is expressed with the suggestion in . . . the Fiji Report that further consideration should be given to the question of the unification of the Fiji and Western Pacific services, and, it is added, federation of the territories." (Para. 491).

There have been several proposals for combining the administration of Papua and North-East New Guinea, right from the time when the mandate was acquired. In 1939 the matter was investigated by an official Australian Commission, which recommended against the suggested merger. (The administrative systems of the two territories show marked divergencies, reflecting in the main their British and German foundations respectively). In 1938 the French Government considered a proposal that the administration of French territories in the Pacific should be brought together under a Comité du Pacifique instead of being dealt with by different ministries and departments. In New Zealand also shortly before the war there were several expressions of official and unofficial opinion in favour of merger of the administrations of Western Samoa and the Cook Islands in the interests of efficiency and economy.

The South Pacific Commission itself has no political or administrative functions. But in its emphasis on the need for co-ordination in policy making, it is fully in accord with the pre-war tendency towards the breaking down of administrative barriers and the solution of island problems on an over-all basis.

Also closely in line with the proposed work of the Commission is the growing practice in the islands of combining specialist services. For example, the Government of Fiji, the High Commission of the Western Pacific and the Government of New Zealand have arranged for co-ordinated and extended medical services throughout territories under their control. Since 1928 there has been a Central Medical School attached to the Suva hospital for the training of natives from Fiji, Western and Eastern Samoa, Guam, the Cook Islands, Tonga, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, the New Hebrides and the Solomons in medical work.

## VII.

How far the South Pacific Commission will be able to bring to fruition (or take advantage of) existing tendencies towards co-ordinated administration and services is not yet clear. Much will depend on the degree to which the administering Powers are able to adjust their policies and systems of government to an effective system of international collaboration.

It would certainly be a mistake to entertain bright expectations on the score of the pre-war tendencies towards co-ordination in the South Seas territories. Most of the co-ordination was in respect of British, Australian and New Zealand territories. Participation of the United States, which controls Eastern Samoa in the South Seas, has been obtained already in some matters of specialist services. But the French and Dutch territories, apart from temporary war-time developments, have played little part in the co-ordination tendency. (French efforts towards co-ordination, referred to above, concern central administration in France rather than organisation in the islands).

Actually the problems faced by British, French, Australian, New Zealand and Dutch administrations in the South Pacific exhibit more considerable diversities than advocates of the South Pacific Commission have been prepared to admit. There are specially marked variations as between British (including Australian and New Zealand) territories on the one hand and French territories on the other. Fundamental differences in colonial policy and in the general colonial problems faced by the ruling Power are very important here. Similarly, the only substantial connection of Holland with the South Seas is geographic. Politically, and to a large extent economically, Dutch New Guinea lies within the East Indies rather than in the South Pacific.

It has to be recognised that the Commission, though its establishment does meet an unquestionable need and though all of the Powers concerned are prepared to collaborate to greater or less degree, reflects Australian and New Zealand pre-occupation with the South-West Pacific even more than it represents a form of co-ordination sought by all the administering States. The two Dominions have adopted foreign policies which stress the need for their own greater participation in Pacific affairs. The South Pacific Commission was suggested by Australia and New Zealand partly in pursuance of these policies. Native welfare and development are ends sincerely sought for their own worth, but they also have political and defence implications in which the two Dominions are vitally concerned.

### The Caribbean Commission

Official discussions of the South Pacific Commission have referred several times to the Caribbean Commission, which possesses several comparable features. In March, 1942, the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission was established "for the purpose of encouraging and strengthening social and economic co-operation between the United States of America and its possessions and bases in the area known geographically and politically as the Caribbean, and the United Kingdom and British Colonies in the same area and to avoid unnecessary duplication of research in these fields." The Commission was to deal with policy relating to labour, agriculture, housing, social welfare and finance. Administration was to remain in the hands of the British and American authorities respectively.

The establishment of the Commission was made the easier because Great Britain had already given the American authorities 99-year leases of bases in the Caribbean and elsewhere in return for American destroyers. The Commission first met in March, 1942, and a Research Council was set up in August, 1943. A regular system of West Indian Conferences under the auspices of the Commission was set up in January, 1944.

The Commission has established a good record of useful service. Its first task was the fight against famine in the islands (which had been worsened by the German submarine campaign). Shipping between the United States and Canadian and colonial shipping lines has been co-ordinated. Plans for stimulating local production of food are already in operation.

Holland and France are now associated with the work of the Commission.

# Has UNRRA Lessons for the South Pacific Commission?

*N. O. P. Pyke*

As UNRRA's activities in the South-West Pacific, contract<sup>1</sup>, those of the South Pacific Commission expand. But there is more of a connection between these instrumentalities than this point of time. The relationship, however, needs careful analysis lest facile comparisons be made and grossly misleading conclusions in consequence follow. This note will try not only to indicate some of the similarities to be seen, but also some of the distinctions to be drawn, in relating UNRRA in the South-West Pacific and the South Pacific Commission. With such a clarification, a more realistic approach to any lessons to be learnt should be at once possible and profitable.

UNRRA is decisively a United Nations agency, whereas the South Pacific Commission merely exists as a regional body within the United Nations Charter, with special reference to its Trusteeship provisions. The main avowed function (and purpose) of UNRRA is relief and rehabilitation in liberated areas, whereas the Commission's main avowed function (and purpose) is the promotion of native welfare and the development of island territories.

It must always be remembered, too, that UNRRA has been operating in the South-West Pacific in war and post-war periods—and in haste—whereas the Commission will, presumably, grow in wisdom and stature at a more tranquil pace in times of comparative peace. In addition, the more regional character of the Commission gives local Governments a greater interest and participation in its activities than the more universal UNRRA administered largely by Great Powers and dominated financially by the U.S.A. Finally, the Commission was first advocated by Australia and New Zealand, early in 1944, whereas the nucleus of UNRRA goes back to British relief plans early in the war, after which United States' additional ideas (and resources) brought the matter to a head and an Agreement.

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1. It must be pointed out that the history of UNRRA in the South-West Pacific, while substantially made, is still far from written. Until this has been done, it is not possible to elaborate in detail any lessons to be learnt.

In the result, it is not wise to stress too heavily the main special facilities and difficulties which have respectively assisted and retarded UNRRA's operations in the South-West Pacific. It is not at all clear just how far these will apply to a different organisation, at a different time, in different places. At the same time the Administration and the Commission are sufficiently similar to make it worth while to indicate some of the outstanding factors in the former's history.

Now, it seems obvious that the Commission will never excite the interest of the multitude to the extent that UNRRA did in its early days. The promotion of native welfare in the South Pacific and the economic development of its islands look pale beside the relief of starving millions and the rehabilitation of devastated continental areas many of which have had sophisticated civilizations. Goodwill and humanitarianism, too, could flow more freely in wartime's emotional atmosphere, presumably by contrast and as a counterpoise to total warfare. The crucial place of the United States in UNRRA, both in administration and finance, also contributed greatly to the wide measure of support evoked. As against all this, however, the Commission will probably need little public support, though the ideas and experience of those who possess first-hand knowledge of South Seas territories will be sought. Further, though there may be an absence of the great enthusiasm which many UNRRA officers brought to their work, the less urgent nature of the Commission's task should facilitate calm counsels and permit of unwearied bodies. The appointment of officers not on good terms with Government Departments, however, would still have to be eschewed.

To UNRRA's activities in the South-West Pacific there have been two closely related sides—the Administration's work and its relations with local Governments. The Administration's work has been primarily concerned with relief and rehabilitation supply, since Britain and Australia did not seek UNRRA field assistance in their liberated dependent areas. The South Pacific Commission will be concerned with field work in dependent territories, but only in terms of advice and information. The lines of the Administration's relations with local Governments were in effect laid down clearly by Australia and New Zealand in official pronouncements in 1944, between the signing of the UNRRA Agreement and the passing of relevant Appropriation Bills. These pronouncements made it clear that requests by UNRRA for personnel and material would be definitely subject to essential war and domestic requirements. Relative to the South Pacific Commission, this suggests that the signing of an agreement may well indicate a very favourable

official attitude but does not necessarily mean that ensuing obligations will have any substantial priority where scarcities exist.

Practical local Government support of the Commission, however, should be expedited by any decrease in government administration as the years pass. However, the active interest may be attracted of fewer Ministers than was the case with UNRRA; but presumably less will need to be done through them and over a longer period. In the case of UNRRA, of course, the implementation of obligations undertaken and resolutions decided upon involved in varying degrees many Government Departments other than External Affairs, Departments whose individual powers, too, had increased under wartime conditions and whose officers were apparently not adequately aware of the relevant obligations, at least in UNRRA's early life. In addition, local Governments had "little administrative experience in servicing international organisation."<sup>2</sup> From the experience gained in relation to UNRRA in 1945-46, the South Pacific Commission may perhaps profit, especially when one reflects on its restricted nature. Further, government administrative staffs will contain fewer temporary senior personnel in times of peace, though this must be balanced with the fact that many wartime appointees in this category were experienced businessmen and local administrators. In the case of UNRRA this situation had seriously retarded operations in the immediate post-war period; for, on top of continuing shortages in personnel and goods, there was the decline in the number of competent administrators who had begun to create and develop administrative practices for dealings with UNRRA.

Finally, it is always possible that even an international agency may be somewhat vitiated, in relation to its first avowed intentions, by mixed and ulterior motives in governments which agree to its formation and participate in its operation. The parliamentary debates which preceded local UNRRA Appropriation Bills sufficiently indicated diverse political, economic and social reasons for supporting such an organisation; political security through the United Nations jostled national prestige, trade opportunity, common humanity, and goodwill in the often redundant pronouncements of the many parliamentarians who then spoke. Such reasons might also be advanced in support of the South Pacific Commission, but they would obviously have far less emotional force. It would seem, however, that the security and prestige points have considerable substance in relation to the Commission, especially since the objects of the Com-

2. G. C. Remington, 'Australia and UNRRA,' *Australian Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 2, June 1946, p. 60.

mission's advisory ministrations are dependent territories with native peoples. As with a body like UNRRA, however, it would be at once indiscreet and impolitic to stress this side, though the recipients of the aid and assistance which such bodies give might have cause to bless its existence.

In all it seems quite clear that the South Pacific Commission will lack the valuable emotional overtones which UNRRA possessed by virtue of the urgency and magnitude of its task and the wide geographical extent of its support and activity. How far the Commission will suffer in consequence is obscure, but its nature suggests that it will not need much public support. It may well run into difficulties, however, in its ultimate dependence for practical assistance on various Government Departments, but it seems unlikely that in times of peace delays and refusals would, in effect, restrict its activities to a quasi-academic accumulation of unused information.

# Defence in Transition

*Gerald Packer*

This article briefly reviews the recent changes in the technical and strategical aspects of Australian defence and summarises the trend of Australian opinion upon them. At the close of the war in Europe, the Melbourne Research Group, tracing the continuity of Government policy between the two wars, concluded that there were three complementary approaches to the problem of post-war defence:<sup>1</sup>

- (a) Mainly within the British Commonwealth and as part of a comprehensive Imperial scheme.
- (b) Mainly within a regional scheme in the South-West Pacific.
- (c) Mainly within an International scheme.

In each case, any external contribution by Australia would be additional to its domestic measures for local defence. Subsequent developments, however, have reduced the prospects of a solution within either an Imperial or an International scheme, leaving the possibilities of a regional scheme for more realistic examination.

## *Atomic Warfare and Australian Defence*

That atomic warfare had probably upset the very basis of military planning and thinking was put lucidly by Max Werner in the following terms:<sup>2</sup>

The atomic bomb has broken the continuity of military art. The make-up of most modern weapons has become as questionable as the composition of the fighting forces, and the rules of grand strategy. There is no link between the atomic bomb and the latest experience and most modern equipment of World War II. The atomic bomb is not developed or derived from any other weapons. Combined with the rocket and with radar, it is changing everything: the type of military organisation, the destructive power and range of weapons, the very concept of military mobility.

This opinion was further emphasised in the report of General Marshall to the U.S. Secretary of State, dated 1st September, 1945, dealing with complementary developments in aircraft and rockets:

All these weapons and their possible combinations make the air approaches of a country the points of extreme danger. Many Americans do

1. Melbourne Research Group, *Post-War Defence of Australia*, 1944, p. 5.

2. Max Werner, 'Atomic Bomb Introduces Fourth Age of War,' *Argus*, 17 November, 1945.

not yet understand the full implication of the formless rubble of Berlin and of the cities of Japan. With the continued development of weapons and techniques now known to us, the cities of New York, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago, or San Francisco may be subject to annihilation from other continents in a matter of hours.

What relation have these conceptions to Australian defence? One suggestion is that atomic warfare, by adding to the insecurity of the smaller nations, may compel the formation of larger regional aggregations, but that in this respect Australia's position was not altogether unfavourable:<sup>3</sup>

Thus, the ultimate political and military result of the atom bomb may well be to force into existence large regional political blocks as a safeguard against the intolerable insecurity of the small national state. Atomic war between such aggregations may well be so unprofitable as to be abandoned by mutual consent. But, for the moment, there is no prospect of adequate political or military defence. Under Australian conditions and until rocket ranges increase, a sustained atomic attack against our industrial centres could only be delivered from some of the islands in the South-West Pacific. There may be some point in holding a limited number of long range bombers and a small mobile airborne ground force for an immediate counter-offensive. There would be some advantage in rearming with high speed jet propelled fighters as an interim measure to counter short range bombing of the type which destroyed Hiroshima. But it is hard to visualise the conditions in which the local defence of Australia could be subject to atomic attack before the issue had been determined elsewhere. Geographical isolation and economic unimportance are at present our best defence. We can contribute to defence against atomic warfare only as part of a United National Organisation or as member of a large regional group, for atomic warfare would force a geopolitical alignment of power in the major land masses. Hitherto local defence has had a proper place in any strategic scheme. Separate local defence is now meaningless and probably impossible in the light of the resources available.

A more sanguine view has been expressed by Air Vice-Marshal Bostock. He considers that, for Australia to survive an atomic war, that war must be fought at our outposts:<sup>4</sup>

Australia is, however, favourably placed geographically. Unlike European countries, our centres of population, industry, and food production are remote from foreign territory. To be effective, attack by atomic weapons would have to be launched from ships or aircraft unless our potential enemy first seized territory from which to develop his atomic offensive. Australia's first requirement for defence remains materially the same as in the last war; that is, to prevent the enemy from occupying land positions or from bringing ships and aircraft within rocket-launching distance of our national centres.

A contrary view is expressed by Brigadier Rasmussen, who con-

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3. 'The Future of the RAAF: an Appraisal,' *Aircraft*, January, 1946.

4. *Herald*, 18 January, 1947.

siders that the island outposts cannot be held, that highly mobile sea-air forces should be maintained ready to deliver an immediate counter-attack and that the necessary Imperial system should be based upon Empire Fleet bases at Manus and Singapore:<sup>5</sup>

In the view of those best qualified to advise, one of the most dangerous theories to which Australia could subscribe is that this country's first line of defence should be a series of garrisons established in the arc of islands extending from the Solomons to the Netherlands Indies. Such a fixed arc of defence is considered to be strategically impracticable. The theory ignores the lesson which the Japanese administered to us—that small garrisons can quickly be eliminated by surprise attack—and the lesson which Australia taught the Japanese—that, after an initial base is obtained, small or large garrisons can be by-passed and reduced later at leisure. It also overlooks future possible uses of a "perfected" V2, and the practicability of its being launched from floating bases.

Firmly held Service opinion is that, instead of thinking in terms of island garrisons, Australia must recognise that its first line of defence is essentially naval; that with the navy must be integrated substantial air forces—real sea-air power to take the first thrust of any attack; that it must be backed by highly trained and mobile land forces, supplied with sufficient fast aerial transport to enable them to be delivered rapidly to danger points.

Specifically, a programme of this character would involve, inter alia: dovetailing of Australian naval resources into an Empire naval pattern; basing of the Empire Far Eastern-Pacific Fleet on Singapore and Manus; inclusion in the R.A.N. of aircraft-carriers and maintenance of a strong fleet air arm; provision of adequate sea-air land bases; maintenance at short call of land forces of all arms capable of becoming rapidly air-borne; firm allotment to those land forces of transport and protective planes to ensure undelayed movement when required.

There has been, unfortunately, little other authoritative public comment upon the implications of atomic warfare. General Sir Thomas Blamey, in a recent article on defence, ignores the atom bomb and urges instant preparation against war and the enforcement of the "universal obligation of the law for all young men to train for military service."<sup>6</sup> Indeed, in his comments upon Government proposals for the Interim and Permanent Military Forces, he visualises "fighting troops in adequate numbers to take the initial shock."<sup>7</sup> He has subsequently stated that atomic warfare, like gas, will either be outlawed by international action or abandoned by mutual consent. Presumably warfare itself will not be outlawed but will follow traditional military lines. It may be inferred that a responsible section of Australian Services opinion agrees with him.

Sir Frederic Eggleston, however, is less sanguine than professional officers upon the prospects of this type of control. In a critical re-

5. J. H. Rasmussen, 'Our Defence—Island Screen Theory,' *Argus*, 15 January, 1946.

6. Sir Thomas Blamey, 'Plan Defences, Now,' *Herald*, 23 November, 1946.

7. Interview in *Herald*, 6 September, 1946.

view of Dr. Bernard Brodie's symposium, "The Absolute Weapon," and of the Baruch report, he points out the weakness of ineffective control and the futility of any control scheme dependent upon the veto. He visualises the amendment of the Charter to include an embargo on force or the threat of force unimpaired by any veto.<sup>8</sup>

It is, perhaps, too soon to expect these divergent points of view to crystallise in official policy. The limited geographical advantages enjoyed by Australia are appreciated. The Bikini tests, too, have shown the vulnerability of sea-borne attack to disruption by the atomic bomb. The main Australian centres of production are for the moment out of rocket range, and Australia is to participate actively in rocket research, making available the necessary facilities in Central Australia to do so. Beyond this point, there is little agreement between those who consider security in pre-war terms of an exclusive Imperial system, those who extend this conception to the Pacific region and those who aver that the problem can only be solved on a world basis. But there is an increasing awareness of the fact that the new weapons forecast in General Marshall's report will take a longer time to develop than was first anticipated and that Australia can count at least on 10-20 years free of major warfare in the South-West Pacific.

### *Imperial Defence*

In the past, the defence of the Empire has been governed by three main principles:

- (a) It was the function of the British Navy to secure sea communications between the parts.
- (b) The Dominions were responsible for their own local defence.
- (c) Methods of training and equipment were standardised as an indispensable aid to mutual reinforcement in war.

It is now clear that recent technical and political developments seriously, perhaps decisively, impair any such exclusive system of Imperial defence. The Empire is no longer self-sufficient for purposes of defence and the basic principles need restatement. In a recent Chatham House study, the study group, appreciating that "the methods of seeking security which proved successful in the simpler times of Drake and Nelson" are no longer enough and that the members of the Commonwealth must seek security in a co-operative effort with other states, concludes:<sup>9</sup>

For the security of the United Kingdom, the hopes and efforts of the

8. Sir Frederic Eggleston, 'Atom Bomb an Absolute Weapon,' *Age*, 30 July, 1946; 'The United Nations Charter Critically Considered,' *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin*, October, 1946, p. 27.

9. Royal Institute International Affairs, *British Security*, 1946, p. 157.

whole nation should be concentrated on the fulfilment of the Charter, the whole Charter and something more than the Charter.

Unfortunately, little progress has been made in the problem of decentralising and redistributing the burden of Empire defence among the Dominions according to their present capacities. The weakness of subsisting arrangements is well summarised in the following critical comment upon the Defence Debate, House of Commons:<sup>10</sup>

Many members felt that the proposed facilities for consultation with the Dominions through liaison officers, though a step in the right direction, do not go far enough. Strategy demands decision, which is something much more than consultation. It is precisely to ensure decision in United Kingdom defence planning that the Ministry of Defence is being created.

Dominions have their own foreign policy, and therefore, necessarily, their separate defence policies as well. That each should undertake the defence of its own territory or region is not, in itself, sufficient as the principle of common action, for it leaves undetermined the most fundamental question of all, namely, how the lines of communication between them are to be defended. In the 19th century this was the Royal Navy's function, and in 1926 the Imperial Conference, in effect, declared that the responsibility must continue to rest on Britain. That resolution is now manifestly outdated, but it has never been rescinded.

Recently the capacity of the United Kingdom to carry the main burden has been affected by a shortage of manpower for home industry which renders the maintenance of large armed forces overseas a matter of increasing difficulty. The costs of maintenance of overseas military establishments are a serious contributory factor to an adverse financial position which can only be remedied by greater production, so that the progressive contraction of United Kingdom overseas commitments is inevitable. In practice, this contraction must result in the virtual withdrawal of United Kingdom forces in the Far East and a substantial reduction of the size and cost of the forces in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. Such changes are now gradually taking place and are likely to continue until the effective limit of British military, naval and air power more closely coincides with immediate British interests in Western Europe and North Africa. This process of withdrawal, seemingly inevitable, undermines the former basis of Imperial defence. Because the British Commonwealth ended the war in decisive victory and with strong armed forces, Australian opinion has not yet apprehended the effect of such drastic movements upon the Imperial structure.

The official attitude on Imperial defence can be quickly summarised. The Prime Minister set out the guiding principles in a

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10. *The Times*, 2 November, 1946.

special statement<sup>11</sup> which endorsed the decisions of the Imperial Conferences from 1923 to 1944, laying special emphasis upon the decentralisation of industry within the Empire, and on the development of machinery for consultation. The Imperial Conference, June 1946, considered these problems but made no tangible progress in either direction for reasons thoroughly publicised. Mr. Chifley, in his subsequent report to the House of Representatives, whilst stressing the need to make the United Nations an effective organisation, made the following points:<sup>12</sup>

- (a) Australia was prepared to make a larger contribution to the defence of the Commonwealth and this could best be done in the Pacific.
- (b) Australia desired to develop a regional scheme of defence in collaboration with United Kingdom and New Zealand.
- (c) A reciprocal arrangement with United States for the joint use of Pacific bases on Australian-controlled territory would be welcomed.

These conceptions show how the former principles of Imperial defence are changing. The British retraction has obliged the Australian Government to extend its regional responsibilities, in the first place, within the Imperial framework. This is a temporary arrangement, though Imperial sentiment and the vestigial remains of official machinery will act as a bar to any speedy evolution.

### *The Development of Regional Organs*

Since the conclusion of the Australia-New Zealand Agreement in 1944, the possibility of regional arrangements in the South-West Pacific within the framework of the Charter has received increased attention. The size of the Pacific encourages the view that regional arrangements consistent with the Charter would promote general stability. In this sense, the Sino-Soviet Treaty might be regarded as a comparable project in the North-West. There are, however, many political and military difficulties in the way of even the most limited regional scheme.

The view is sometimes taken that Britain, Australia and New Zealand should confine themselves to maintaining the security of their position in the South and West Pacific. But Britain has vital interests elsewhere in the Pacific and, after enumerating the objectives of British policy, the Chatham House study on British security concludes that it is impossible for Britain in this way to contract out of the Pacific.<sup>13</sup> The British attitude may more clearly emerge in the course of the South Seas Conference but apparently a limited and exclusive Imperial scheme is unacceptable.

11. Prime Minister's Statement on Empire Defence, *Age*, 22 December, 1945.

12. Prime Minister's Statement, 19 June, 1946.

13. *British Security*, p. 129.

A further strategic complication arises from the changed status of the Imperial Powers, Britain, Holland and France, in South-East Asia. The replacement of the former administrations by national minorities, dominated by anti-European politicians, some of whom were pro-Japanese in war, seems likely to preclude for the present the extension of a South-West regional scheme beyond British Commonwealth territory. This position is very different from that envisaged when the Australia-New Zealand agreement was completed. Until political conditions in South-East Asia are more stable, it is impossible to estimate the chances of a more fruitful regional understanding, even though discussions with the Dutch and French may be proceeding. There are, however, some interesting pointers. Sutan Sjahrir, for example, disclaiming any intention of entering the Pan-Malayan union advocated by Romulo of the Philippines, stressed his personal desire for close political and economic and cultural relations with Australia.<sup>14</sup> A somewhat similar proposal is put forward by Mr. Panikar,<sup>15</sup> in a plea for a regional security system for the Indian Ocean. He shows that, historically, the defence of India is mainly a naval problem and considers that a purely landward defence must give way to a comprehensive sea-air system, in which Australia should participate.

A final factor, obvious but sometimes ignored, is the paramount strategic and economic position which the United States now enjoys in the Western Pacific. No regional scheme which ignored United States interests can be entertained. The issue for Australia has recently been summarised bluntly in the following terms:<sup>16</sup>

It seems clear that regional security in the sense in which it was understood in the nineteen-twenties has disappeared. Whether we like it or not, the U.S. has, and is likely to have for the next twenty years, the greatest power in the Pacific; whether we like it or not, Australia can make only a limited contribution to her own defence. Our future security depends on the closest liaison with the U.S. If she desires bases in our islands, or even on the mainland, why should rights not be granted?

Unfortunately, the need to negotiate for a satisfactory scheme with the United States has been obscured by a difference of opinion over reciprocal rights for the use of Manus Island. A section of Australian Service opinion desires to retain Manus Island for the use, presumably, of the Far Eastern Fleet. Sir Thomas Blamey, supporting this view upon general grounds, states<sup>17</sup>

We would be blind to the teaching of all history if we allow any nation, however friendly its disposition towards us may be at the moment,

14. G. Jenkins, 'New Block in S.E. Asia Proposed,' *Argus*, 16 October, 1946.

15. K. M. Panikar, *India and the Indian Ocean*, 1945.

16. Anon., 'Security for Australia,' *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin*, October, 1946, p. 32.

17. Sir Thomas Blamey, 'Manus must Remain under our Control,' *Argus*, 2 February, 1946.

to occupy a base in an area vital to our safety and to which we alone can lay a just and proper claim.

Australian editorial opinion emphatically favours the completion of a satisfactory arrangement with United States, though it is fair to add that the conflicting attitude and statements of United States officials upon naval requirements and upon presumptive rights to mandated bases has delayed an understanding.<sup>18</sup> The terms of a satisfactory understanding would, however, go beyond the provision of bases for mutual use. The value of naval and other facilities in Australia and New Zealand to United States, slight as it may be at the moment, depends ultimately, in the words of Walter Lippman, "upon the power and will of Australians and New Zealanders to defend, maintain and support them."<sup>19</sup> This ability presumes much the same standardisation of basic weapons and organisation with United States as has been customary within the framework of Imperial Defence. Some such standardisation has already been agreed as between Britain and United States in certain directions, and it is reasonably clear that a regional arrangement in the South-West Pacific, to have any practical value, must proceed along similar lines of a closer relation to the American system, whatever the short term disadvantages might appear to be.<sup>20</sup> At the same time, any closer link with United States in this respect might well preclude a regional scheme which embraced European Powers other than Britain. Indeed, whilst world security itself is dependent upon better relations between the great Powers, to talk in terms of regional security in the South-West Pacific assumes that the Charter may fail and that Australia should now determine her future political and military alignment.

#### *Security Within the Charter*

Finally, one section of Australian opinion regards security as a world problem on the familiar grounds that peace is indivisible. This view, supported by cautious New Year editorial optimism on the prospects of world peace through the United Nations Organisation, is well expressed as follows:<sup>21</sup>

The numerically weak can survive only by an intelligent foreign policy, by developing to the highest degree the mental resources of its citizens and the growth of industry, and by assimilating carefully chosen strains by immigration. All these demand work both mental and physical. Nothing,

18. *Australian Press Opinion on Foreign Policy*, Serial 15, April 1946.

19. *Herald Tribune*, 29 February, 1944.

20. There would appear to be solid advantages in examining a scheme similar to that of mutual aid between Canada and United States announced since this article was written. An alternative might be the establishment of a closer link with the Canadian defence system.

21. Anon., 'Security for Australia,' *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin*, October, 1946, p. 34.

however, that Australia alone can do will guarantee her future safety—that is a problem that can be solved only on a world basis.

The Australian Government announced its intention to contribute a proportion of the armed forces necessary to establish a system of world collective security, but the provisions of the Charter on this point have recently been subjected to more critical examination. It is now clear that the Charter is far from constituting a complete system either for the avoidance of war or for the practical enforcement of sanctions. Indeed, as the Chatham House study emphasises, the Charter expressly disclaims, through its voting procedure, any intention to use the threat of united coercion in order to prevent the use of force by any of its five principal members or by any other member who is assured of the full diplomatic support of any one of them. Thus, in the event of Britain or any member of the Commonwealth being faced with a combination of enemies so strong that she is unable to overcome them without assistance, it is highly unlikely that such assistance would be forthcoming from the Organisation. Furthermore, the power of the Council, conveyed under Article 39 of the Charter, to settle all disputes which appear to it to affect peace, and to formulate and enforce terms of settlement, gives so enormous a degree of power that the abandonment of the veto by the great Powers is most unlikely.<sup>22</sup> For the time being, then, it would be impracticable to place any final dependence upon collective guarantees under the Charter. Australia may be obliged to seek some alternative, and that alternative can no longer be an exclusive scheme of Imperial defence of the former type.

Two practical aspects of world security may briefly be mentioned: disarmament and atomic energy control. Editorial opinion, welcoming Soviet agreement upon the abolition of the veto over any system of arms control and inspection, was sceptical of any real advance to disarmament not preceded by a political settlement. Similar views were expressed upon the Baruch proposal for atomic control.<sup>23</sup> Service opinion, as already stated, is more optimistic and apparently considers that the atom bomb, and the use of virulent bacteria will be outlawed de facto, if not de jure. But if this were the case, it is hard to visualise the need for any but the most rudimentary preparations for war.

The technical and strategic changes, briefly summarised herein, have altered the requirements of a sound scheme of post-war defence to an extent not fully appreciated yet by Australian public

22. Sir Frederic Eggleston, 'The United Nations Charter Critically Considered,' op. cit., p. 27. *British Security*, pp. 144, 156.

23. *Australian Press Opinion on Foreign Policy*, Serials 17, 18, 23.

opinion. The former emphasis upon sea-borne invasion and the control of sea communications is outmoded by the atom bomb and other equally significant changes in military weapons. In these circumstances an exclusive system of Imperial defence of the pre-war type is no longer adequate and there is little prospect of a closer integration of British and Dominion defence forces. Furthermore, the serious economic and financial difficulties of Britain are gradually causing a retraction of British military forces in the Far East to a degree which renders future British operations in South-West Pacific problematic. The immediate Australian reaction—to form a regional security system in the first place, within the Imperial framework, does not seem likely to succeed in face of current political changes in South-East Asia. Indeed, any realistic local scheme must depend upon the closest collaboration with United States on matters of defence, involving standardisation of equipment and organisation on the strategical level and political understanding on the policy level. The alternative is to rely upon and contribute to a world system of collective security through the United Nations Organisation. More critical appraisal of the Charter, however, suggests that an effective arrangement is not in sight. If, however, the United Nations Organisation could effectively control atomic and similar weapons, then such control would in itself need to extend to the control of the use of force. In this event, a substantial degree of universal disarmament would be in reasonable prospect. Meanwhile, Australia needs to maintain a basic organisation of industry and the armed forces until the real character of the problem is clarified.

# The United Nations Charter Critically Considered: The Trusteeship Provisions.<sup>1</sup>

*Sir Frederic Eggleston*

The Trusteeship chapters of the Charter (XI, XII and XIII) arise out of a deep-felt problem of modern times, which has been accentuated by the growing interdependence of the world system—the fact that highly developed and completely undeveloped nations exist side by side with ever increasing relations with one another. In the circumstances, it is almost impossible to prevent the highly developed nation from dominating the more primitive one. This feature, of course, does not arise in the 20th century. The Colonial System, as we know it, took its start in the 16th and 17th centuries with the exploration of the world by European navigators. Empires have been established, the primitive peoples have been exploited and, in some cases, enslaved. In time, more humane principles of Colonial Government have developed in some Empires but not in others.

It is impossible to continue the system indefinitely, because some of the dependent peoples have developed self-consciousness and demand the recognition of their rights or attention to their needs. The problem would be relatively simple if these dependent peoples were capable of self-government, if they were educated and literate and had a developed social and economic organisation. But these conditions do not exist. Many of these people are in the primitive tribal stage without definite organisation and leaders. Others constitute petty principalities, without much social organisation and dominated by an upper class with no ideals. Others have enjoyed developed institutions, which have decayed, and are in the charge of effete rulers. In all, the vast majority is in a state of extreme poverty unable to see beyond the needs of subsistence. These peoples of all different types are grouped under European Powers and the only semblance of unity they possess is the imperial system under which they live. They do not, as a rule, form single communities but congregations of tiny social units without mutual ties.

1. The second article of a series begun in the *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin*, October, 1946

It is, in my opinion, idle to say that these people can stand by themselves in a modern world. There is a rather naive view to be found in some countries like the United States of America that every people has the right to govern itself, and that it has inherently the capacity to do so. This is not true. It is part of the abstract philosophy of Thomas Jefferson. The incapacity of poverty-stricken and illiterate peoples is only too obvious.

The difficulty intensifies with the increase in military organisation and armaments in the modern world. These people occupy important strategic areas; they possess large populations which can be trained for war. They thus form a lure for any military State which wishes to increase its military manpower or secure strategic bases. In a jungle world these dependent races, within or without the great Empires, will be centres of serious instability if some means are not adopted for bringing them into a world system.

The conclusion of the last war presented an opportunity for a step forward. The Mandates System applied merely to the possessions wrested from Germany in World War I, but the Colonial System, as a whole, was far vaster. Besides, additional colonies had been conquered from Japan and Italy. There was no real reason why the system of accounting for colonial responsibilities should not be extended to all dependent peoples. There were certainly some territories where a considerable amount of self-government had been given and the people were heading for what is called Dominion status, similar to that possessed by Australia and New Zealand. These peoples would not relish being given the status of beneficiaries in a trust.

When Australia came to the San Francisco Conference, she was in favour of a system of accountability for all non-self-governing dependent peoples. She met, however, with a considerable amount of opposition from other Governments which prevented the full realisation of her ideals and resulted in the provision of the three chapters of the Charter which I have mentioned. The opposition from Britain was disappointing, but I do not think that public opinion in England was against the system. The Churchill Government, and possibly the Colonial Office, were strongly opposed, but eventually supported it. The most disappointing opposition was that from the United States. Australia expected support from that quarter on account of the free criticism of colonial imperialism from American academics and publicists in the past. But it was soon evident that, though this attitude was present in the State Department, it was strongly opposed by the Services, who wished

complete control of the islands conquered from Japan, and these Services were strongly supported by the bulk of Congressional opinion.

South Africa was also opposed to the system owing to its unfortunate experience in South-West Africa. France was opposed and so was Holland. It is noteworthy that neither of these Empires was able to defend the vast territories it occupied. In their hands they are almost as dangerous foci of instability as they would be in the hands of the primitive tribes.

On the other hand, there were at the Conference a number of small States which had recently attained self-government and still possessed illiterate populations. There were, in particular, a number of Arab States anxious to see the Palestine mandate terminated. The conjuncture of a number of grudging great Powers and a number of small Powers eager for irrelevant objectives had bad results.

An outstanding feature of the Conference was the ignorance of the history of the Mandates System, the reasons advanced at its inception and the way in which it had worked out in practice. The system was based on the principle of responsibility coupled with ex post facto accountability to an expert body, free so far as possible from politics. In order to make this system work, the trustee State should be given full administrative power with complete initiative and discretion within wide limits. Anything like joint government must be avoided. It is not possible to exact responsibility from a government if it is hedged round with too many conditions or can plead an alibi owing to the default of a partner in government. A government will never do any good for a territory unless we can pin on it the responsibility for initiative. It must anticipate problems—not wait on an outside authority to point out its policy.

This is why the account should be ex post facto. The administering Power must be given an opportunity of initiating and carrying out its authority and then be judged according to the way in which it works out. This is a perfectly good principle of the science of administration. It is exemplified in the position of the Auditor General in the British system and in the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons. It is recognised by all experts on public finance that, if these authorities interfere in policy or dictate it, they are then unable to judge the results from a detached point of view. I believe that these principles worked well in the Mandates System and, in fitting myself to make this judgment, I have read every report of a mandatory State and every report of the Mandates Commission. I do not suggest that the Mandates System

was an unqualified success. It secured political stability, but the reason for its relative failure was the failure of the mandatory States to recognise that they had a definite duty to promote the economic and social development of the territories committed to them.

There was another important phase of the Versailles system. Mandated territories were virtually demilitarised. Natives could not be trained except for self-defence; bases could not be erected in the territories. This ensured that mandated territories should not become a factor in strategy and that they should not be sought by States which wanted to increase their military effectiveness. This was a good idea. At San Francisco, simply because Japan used her islands as bases, the idea was discredited. But, if there had been a provision for inspection, the Japanese plans would have been revealed years ago.

There is no inherent reason why, if expert opinion says that a base in a trust territory is necessary, it should not be constituted so long as it is taken out of the territory and the other conditions are not affected. But the idea that in the South Seas there is any lack of bases and that there are only one or two points at which bases can be established is wrong. There are hundreds of potential bases in the Pacific area. Every coral atoll is a potential base, and it would not do any harm if bases like Manus and Rabaul were demilitarised because there is plenty of non-trust territory available nearby on which bases could be established. Any bases established in trust territory should be in pursuance of a scheme of international security under the Charter.

I will only sketch in broad outline the provisions of the Charter on Trusteeship. They are very detailed and it would serve no useful purpose in paraphrasing them in a paper like this. The reader should have the Chapter in his hand while I give my ideas as to how the essentials of the system, as I conceive them, are embodied.

The chief conclusions of interest are:—

(1) There is no general application of a system of trusteeship enforced by a process of account to all dependent territories. There is, in Chapter XI, a declaration of the principles which should be applied in administering dependent territories. These are in vague terms but they generally affirm the paramount interest of the natives and the obligations of the trustee to advance their political, social and economic interests. There is, however, no provision for any report to any authority or review by it. The Chapter contains only promises without the means of ensuring that they will be carried into effect.

(2) Chapter XII contains provision for bringing territories

under trusteeship in which there is a system of accounting. Certain objectives are set out very similar to those in Chapter XI, so that the accounting authority has something to guide it. The chief defect of this Chapter is that the submission of a territory to the Trusteeship System is purely voluntary on the part of a Colonial Power. Article 77 provides that the Trusteeship System shall apply to territories in the following categories:

- (a) territories now held under mandate;
- (b) territories which may be detached from enemy States as a result of the Second World War;
- (c) territories voluntarily placed under the system by States responsible for their administration;

but it is provided that the system applies to such only of those territories as may be placed therein by means of a Trusteeship Agreement.

An agreement is not an agreement unless two parties consent to it and thus the whole system is voluntary. Not even the old mandates nor the territories conquered from the enemy States during the war come necessarily under the system. This is made quite clear by Article 77(2) which provides that ". . . it will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the Trusteeship System and upon what terms."

This leads us to Article 79 which says that the terms of trusteeship for each territory are to be negotiated with the States directly concerned, including the mandatory States in the case of territories held under mandate, and approved by the General Assembly or, in the case of strategic areas, by the Security Council. The States directly concerned are not defined and it is exceedingly difficult to say what is meant. Leaving a patent ambiguity of this kind in a legal document is characteristic of those who were concerned with the draftsmanship of the Charter. All we know is that the mandatory State must be one of the States directly concerned, but whether the others are determined by contiguity or whether they relate to the original allied and associated Powers who granted the original mandate is not defined. We thus have an exceedingly bad start for the system.

Nobody is bound to bring colonies under trusteeship and, as the Trusteeship provisions involve a certain amount of interference with sovereign discretion, there is a very great objection, even on the part of States who are quite honest, to submit to such interference. Indeed, if it were not for the members of the British Commonwealth, the Trusteeship System might fail altogether. Moreover, the provisions of Articles 76 and 77 will undoubtedly be used to alter

some of the strict terms of the original mandate. If the terms are not satisfactory to the trustee State, it will refuse to put the territories under trusteeship. There will be plenty of opportunity for other States to put in terms which are not necessary but which purport to carry out the purpose of Article 76. Thus a declaration of equality for members of the United Nations is contained in Article 76. Naturally any attempt to secure those rights in trust territories will have a good deal of support.

In this respect, the British members of the United Nations have placed themselves in a bad bargaining position because they have already announced that they will place their territories under trusteeship. Although this does not bind them to accept all the conditions that may be sought to be imposed on them, it will be very difficult for them to withdraw, especially as they have been great exponents of this system. On the other hand, the United States has not suggested placing any territories under trusteeship other than the former Japanese mandated islands which, it is proposed, should be defined as strategic areas under American trusteeship. South Africa and Holland seem equally determined not to place their territories under trusteeship. They will all, no doubt, claim the benefit of the equality conditions though they make no sacrifices themselves.

(3) The authority of the United Nations is to be exercised by a Trusteeship Council provided for in Article 86 and this Council is to have fairly wide powers including the power of periodic visits and acceptance of petitions. It is quite clear that the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations was hampered by its inability to make inspections of mandated territories. This would have increased its prestige, and the fortification of the Japanese mandated islands would certainly have been discovered if this had been permitted. The objections of a mandatory State to inspection, however, have some substance. If it is carried too far or the Trusteeship Council displays a tendency to interfere or to work up the local inhabitants against the trustee nations, the system will certainly break down. This would be a bad thing for the world and for the inhabitants in question.

The Mandates Commission of the League, however, was an expert body. It has been accused of being political, but anyone who has read its reports as a whole will see that the members did really consider themselves as experts and acted as such. Unfortunately the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations is not an expert body. It consists of the members administering trust territories, the members of the Security Council who are not adminis-

tering trust territories, and an equal number of other members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly. This is a purely political body and when feelings are disturbed among the members of the Security Council or the United Nations as a whole, the Trusteeship Council affords an excellent opportunity for one member or the other to damage an opponent which is a trustee.

This seems to me to be a most unfortunate situation. It is only another illustration of the fact that many of the members of the San Francisco Conference were either ignorant of the principles of the Mandates System or wished to create an instrument which would achieve certain political objectives quite different from the interests of the people of the trust territories.

The whole principle of the Mandates System is that trust is reposed in the trustee. The fact is that the idea of trusteeship is foreign to a great many legal systems; the French language, for example, has no term for "trustee." In English law, of course, "trusteeship" occupies an important place. Englishmen can understand the immense importance of giving full power to trustees subject to legal review. For instance, when an English lawyer draws a will he gives full plenary powers to the trustee appointed. It is regarded as foolish to limit the trustee's powers. He has to have the discretion to deal with difficult situations and problems. It is only in a case where he has shown an incapacity to handle the problems that his administration has to be under the control of Chancery, and then the results are pretty disastrous as the case of *Jarndyce and Jarndyce* shows.<sup>2</sup>

(4) The objectives of the Trusteeship System are defined, as I have said, in Article 76, and they follow the usual lines:—

- (a) to further international peace and security;
- (b) to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence . . . .

This clause caused a great deal of controversy because of the opposition of a great many American and other similarly "idealistic" Powers to the use of the word "self-government." The view was that "self-government" did not necessarily mean "independence."

There is no doubt that the Colonial System has to end in time. The Colonial Empires are not showing capacity to govern alien peoples aware of their rights and developing cultures, and, in that case, it is not possible for them to maintain their position indefinitely.

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2. See *Bleak House*, by Charles Dickens.

It is a merciful dispensation of Providence that there is now sufficient time to train dependent peoples in the art of self-government. The Trusteeship System must do that—it is essential. The world will be forever unstable if it consists of people in all sorts of different stages of development—from primitive tribes to highly-developed States. The aim should be self-government within the world order. But, if self-government can be attained within large units, such as the British Commonwealth of Nations, it is all to the good. Independence is not a worthwhile idea at the present time when what we want to strive for is interdependence. It gives a slant in favour of separatism which is undesirable.

Paragraph (b) of Article 76 goes too far and betrays the distrust of the Colonial Empires, in some cases, as in the British Empire, quite undeservedly. The action which the Trusteeship Council should take should be determined as circumstances develop and not set down in such detail as it is here.

Paragraph (d), however, is more specific. It provides that the system shall secure equal treatment in social, economic and commercial matters for all members of the United Nations. This is to be without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objective, which is the interest of the natives, and subject to the provisions of Article 80, which is a saving of the rights under the old Mandates System. The question is whether this gives an "open door." The representatives of the United States appear to suggest that it does. This would mean freedom of migration as well as freedom of trade, and the trustee would have to show that freedom of migration and freedom of trade would prejudice the promotion of political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants.

There is very little difficulty, in my opinion, in proving this in regard to migration, because a mixture of races in countries like New Guinea would mean the obliteration of the present inhabitants or, at any rate, the destruction of their tribal organisation on which their whole ethnical structure depends.

The same does not apply so clearly with regard to economic matters. I do not believe that the right of any United Nation to place economic installations, such as aerodromes, for aerial or marine navigation or to establish oil wells or hydro-electrical undertakings in any trust territory without control can possibly be justified. Control, it seems to me, must be left to the trustee because of the social and cultural repercussions of these economic developments. But, if control is exercised, it should not, in ordinary circumstances, be exercised in favour of the trustee people only. It is hoped that, in the Trusteeship Agreements, no further specification of detailed

control will be made. There is no way of running the Trusteeship System except by reposing trust in the trustee, subject to an ex post facto review by an expert authority.

(5) The last matter of importance is the provision for strategic areas. It is provided for in Article 82: "There may be designated in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43."

The agreements under Article 43 are the agreements to be made by all member States agreeing to assist and afford facilities to the United Nations in the enforcement of its sanctions. The strategic area may include the whole or any part of the trust territory, and when it is declared a strategic area, the area is administered by the trustee under the Security Council, although the basic objectives are applicable.

It is quite clear, of course, that in the dealings of the Security Council, military considerations will entirely dominate the administration.

As I have already said, I do not believe that there is any necessity for the limitation of strategic areas, at any rate so far as the South Seas are concerned. The position is different in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. In the South Seas, there are hundreds of potential bases and the selection of one base in one area can always be matched by another base a few miles away. I believe that the bases that are necessary for the international security scheme should be selected and they should be handed over to the Military Staff Committee and taken out of trust territory. The answer of the Services to this is that the bases have no value unless the surrounding area is held. But what is the limit of the surrounding area? It can be extended until it involves thousands of square miles. In the sort of scheme that will be required in the atomic age, these bases do not need large supporting areas. However, the draftsmen of the Charter were so concerned that the trust territories should not be taken out of military consideration that they passed Article 84, which provides that: ". . . it shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security."

This was a complete reversal of the original mandate idea that mandated territories should be demilitarised. This means that they are to be treated as part of the world security system and, as the remainder of the Article provides, their natives can be trained for

military purposes. Thus they are a military asset to the State that holds them, and thus trusteeships will be sought, not for an innocent desire to promote the interests of the savages, but for the purpose of enhancing the military resources of the trustee Power.

The general conclusion must, in my opinion, be that the Mandates System has not been improved in the Trusteeship provisions of the Charter except for the general declaration of objectives. This failure is due partly to a lack of knowledge of the way in which the Mandates System worked and also to a failure to grasp the principles of Colonial Government. We will pay the penalty for our failure to treat international affairs on a more scientific basis.

# Australia's Foreign Policy

*Gordon Greenwood*

I feel that there is an air of unreality about a good deal of discussion on an Australian foreign policy because most of us have not given adequate attention to what one might call the basic considerations that govern any foreign policy. For example, I do not think that you can either praise or condemn Dr. Evatt's foreign policy unless first of all you are sure in your own mind about the objectives which that policy is designed to achieve. Ever since the time of the triumph of the national State in the nineteenth century, it would be fair to say that the main object of foreign policy has been the achievement of the security of the individual nation concerned and that, whatever form foreign policy may have taken, the chief end has always been: the survival in independence and security of the national unit. I want us to be clear about what that implies. I think it implies that national States or their governments have always pursued the national interest before any other kind of interest. It is true, of course, that some States have been more ruthless, more blatant, in their methods; and that other States have been more law-abiding. But I think you can always say that when the crisis has come and the survival of the nation has been placed in jeopardy, all other considerations have then been cast aside in favour of an effort to secure that survival. I do not think that the behaviour of the nations is likely to be radically different in the future, at any rate so long as you have a retention of national sovereignty. So I think it would be fair to conclude, with regard to Australian foreign policy, that whatever the methods we choose the end always remains the same: the survival of independence with as full an opportunity for self-development of the nation and the people as possible.

So I feel that the search is solely for the methods that are most likely to achieve that particular objective, and that governments, just because they are governments, will always feel that their efforts must be dedicated to the pursuit of the national interest. It is different with individuals. They may have a different kind of responsibility, but I will turn to that in a moment. If you examine

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1. Report of address and discussion at a meeting of the N.S.W. Branch of the Institute on October 24th, 1946.

recent trends in Australian foreign policy, you will agree that the Government itself recognises that the chief end of its policy is security. Take, for instance, the recent article which Dr. Evatt published in the "Sydney Morning Herald" during the election campaign.<sup>2</sup> You will find that in it he listed eight major objectives of governmental policy. Almost every one of them, you could say, I think, related in some form or another to the security of this country, and I think it is significant that that word appears no less than five times in that very short list. The methods he employed may of course be of vital importance, and that brings me to the second point that I want to throw out for discussion: whether Australia can be said to possess an independent foreign policy or, if you prefer it: can Australia subscribe to the conditions that govern the possession of such a policy? I suppose that, theoretically, any sovereign State is in the position to formulate its own foreign policy and that, legal technicalities aside, Australia can be regarded as a sovereign State. Historically, of course, what has governed the successful application of a foreign policy has invariably been the possession of power. So it is in this context of power that I want to discuss policy for the moment. I think that the tests of whether a nation can in fact have an independent foreign policy are: can it be really expected to make good the commitments into which it enters? Can it reasonably be expected to offer a satisfactory defence of its own country, and of its own interests? Has it within its own possession the right to decide the major issue of war or of peace?

If you apply tests of that kind to Australia, I think it is fairly clear that Australia cannot possibly subscribe to conditions of that kind. It is clear that Australian power is limited and that our policy has been framed in accordance with our capacity to make good our obligations under our commitments. You might argue that this is a very old-fashioned view of foreign policy and that it has been outdated by the obligations which the various nations have assumed towards UNO. But if you take the attitude of governments as against that of individuals, you will see that governments tend to remember that not wholly dissimilar obligations were assumed towards the League of Nations, and will tend to base their policy on what they know about the behaviour of States; and we know a good deal about that in the context of national sovereignty.

So perhaps the most vital question of all in the international field to-day is whether or not in fact the behaviour of States in the

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2. Sydney Morning Herald, 24 September, 1946.

future is likely to be basically different from what it has been in the past. I think that that is the most vital question because I believe that on the answer which the various governments give to it will depend the kind of foreign policy that they will pursue. For Australia, as well as for all small nations, the issue can be regarded as more crucial than for the great Powers, because all the evidence shows that the extent of our freedom of action is likely to depend upon the nature of international politics. That is to say, if you have a world of competing nation States it is fairly clear that your liberty of action is likely to be curtailed. Also it can only be seriously enlarged if we are able to achieve an internationally regulated world in which power is no longer the chief determinant of the relationships between States and other kinds of values will begin to be appreciated: a world in which the smaller nations will have an opportunity to make their own contribution towards proving, to use the words of Dr. Evatt, "that the great Powers do not have a monopoly of good intentions, of wisdom or of experience."

So I suggest that the answer to one of the important questions that I pose to-night can only be a conditional kind of answer. That is to say, if you have an internationally regulated world, Australia will be in a position to play a much more prominent part than would actually be warranted by her resources or power. But if, on the other hand, you believe that there is any probability, or possibility, that power politics will be able to perpetuate itself, then the most careful consideration must be given to the extent of the commitments that this country assumes. More than that, caution would dictate that Australia should not commit herself beyond her powers and resources. If you agree that the main objective of our foreign policy is security, then it is pertinent to ask: what are the interests that we have been accustomed to regard as most vitally affecting our security? Putting them very briefly, I think that they would be: our attitude towards the islands adjacent to our coast; our attitude on immigration policy; and our connection with the British Commonwealth.

That brings me to the further question that I want to explore: whether the various political parties in this country are, in fact, agreed on the fundamentals of our own foreign policy. The heat of the party struggle might suggest that there is a good deal of cleavage between the parties on this issue, but I believe that that is actually not the case and that they are in agreement on basic issues. I think you can say that all significant parties approve the island strategy, give support to the principle of immigration exclusion, or

"White Australia," and the maintenance of our connection with Britain. They believe, too, in extending support to the United Nations Organisation so that there is a general agreement upon fundamentals. Where the cleavage occurs is, of course, over the methods that might be pursued in order to achieve those objectives.

I have not time to trace through the developments in the attitude of the parties towards external affairs, but I would point for a moment to the important changes that have taken place in the Labour attitude towards foreign policy. That attitude came about for a variety of reasons: the very fact that the Opposition became the Government; the shock as a result of the events after Pearl Harbour, and so on. If you look for examples of that change of attitude, I believe that you will find them, for instance, in the matter of compulsory service overseas. You will recall the concessions that Labour made there. You will find them also in the changed attitude on the question of Imperial solidarity. Before 1939 the Labour Party, while giving allegiance to support for the British Commonwealth, was, I think, just a little suspicious of such a connection, but there have been a number of recent signs of increasing Imperial solidarity. Again, there has been the stress on the independent status which Australia should enjoy as a unit in the international world: the right, if you like, for Australia to develop an individual policy.

What has the Opposition said about the recent trend in the Government's foreign policy? I think that the Opposition criticisms have been concentrated about three main issues. In the first place, it has been argued by the Opposition that the policy of the Government is over-pretentious; that it is prone to make exaggerated claims; that it is in danger of accepting obligations that are beyond its power to fulfil. The second point of criticism is that the Government's policy is far too much the personal policy of the Minister for External Affairs. The third is that his methods give the impression of lack of unanimity with Britain. Criticisms of that kind do at least serve to show that the Labour Party is not beyond reproach. And yet I point out that one of the significant facts about the recent election was that foreign policy did not become a dominant issue. There are a variety of reasons, and one is the regrettable fact that very few people in this country happen to be interested in other than domestic affairs. I believe that another reason is that there is no basic divergence between the parties; and, thirdly, that the Opposition parties did not think they could, with any degree of success, attack the kind of policy that the Government had been pursuing overseas.

Finally, I want to ask, "What methods are the Government employing at the moment to ensure Australian security and to defend Australian interests generally?" In the first place, I think you could say that the Government is persistently reiterating its demand for full consultation at the highest level on any matter that directly affects Australian interests. In the second place, the Government is undoubtedly making a systematic and extensive effort to obtain a hearing in the councils of the world and to influence the decisions that are made at those councils. In particular, Australian efforts have been directed towards the establishment of an international system that will give the middle and the small Powers a greater opportunity for self-expression and determination on international policy. In other words, Australia has been striving for what you might describe as a democratisation of the UNO machinery. The most notable example of that is, of course, in relation to the attack that has been made by Dr. Evatt on the way in which the veto operates. There are just two points in that connection which have some importance and reveal certain of the difficulties that arise with the Australian attitude. One relates to the veto question and to the dilemma in which Australia finds herself. I must confess that I have a good deal of sympathy with the attitude that has been expressed by Dr. Evatt on the principle of the veto. I feel that it is worth while to make the kind of protest that he has been making and to fight for this democratisation of the UNO. machinery. At the same time, there are certain dangers in the line that is being followed. One is that the essential thing to-day is to give time for the UNO. to be built up and to develop effectively. I feel that it is better to have a halting and ineffective system rather than no system at all. I do not think you could have a workable international system without the participation of the Soviet Union, and I do not think it would be likely to participate in any real way or with any genuine sense of trust if the veto were taken away. So that seems to be the very real dilemma in which we find ourselves.

Dr. Evatt said a good deal about the implementation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, the provision of social and economic justice for all peoples, and the like. There, too, I think it is doubtful whether we have thought through the implications of that kind of policy. One, of course, supports the principle of national self-expression, and social and economic justice, and so on; but it seems to me that the ultimate and logical implication of what Dr. Evatt has been advocating is the abnegation of national sovereignty and the possibility that, on matters that a number of

nations regard as vitally affecting their own interests, the decision will be made by an international body. Would the Government and the Australian people be prepared to face an adverse decision on a question like immigration exclusion, for instance? The decision might not go against us, but we have to face up to such a possibility. Dr. Evatt has always argued that it is only a domestic issue, but you will agree that that is not wholly the case, because it has external repercussions of some significance. In addition to the support for UNO. and participation in its various activities, Australia, and I think this is also true of most other nations, has been following a policy that might be described as "taking out an insurance." It takes two main forms. There are, of course, subsidiary points: for example, our attempt to ensure against future Japanese aggression; but in the main I think that it takes the form of additional Imperial solidarity, at any rate with relation to defence. You can see it in the Anzac Pact, in our co-operation with New Zealand, and in the various defence arrangements that we are entering into with the British Government at the moment. The second point is the fostering of close and friendly relations with the United States. Dr. Evatt, on behalf of the Government, claims that his policy has been fully justified by results. That in turn raises the important question, when can a policy be said to be justified? What are the tests that you can apply before you can say that a policy be justified by results? In my view there are two. The policy must not unduly sacrifice what you might regard as legitimate national interests; and it must be framed and implemented in such a way that the policy appears practicable and reasonable to other Powers whose support will be essential if it is to be carried to fruition. For instance, if you consider our attitude at European conferences, it does seem bad strategy to have moved an enormous number of amendments on matters pertaining to peace in Europe. It is bad strategy in the sense that you may have one or two amendments that are vital to our point of view, but you are going to lose support for those vital amendments if you over-expend your activities in matters that are not fundamental. You can see it, too, in relation to the Anzac Pact, where you have an over-assertion of nationalism or, at any rate, a tactlessness in the phraseology.

You can also see it in relation to United States bases, and I believe that in this connection we are chasing the shadow instead of the substance by our efforts to obtain sovereignty over certain island bases. It is in our Pacific policy that the greatest weakness emerges. We have been very insistent about our rights in the Pacific, almost to the point of primacy. Yet when you get a situation such as that arising in Indonesia, which is obviously of vital concern to Australia,

the Government in fact has no policy at all, unless you call doing nothing a policy. I think, too, that our relations with the United States are not all that they might be. Again, in relation to our immigration policy, I feel that the Government has missed a very real opportunity to win good-will in Asia, not by abandoning our policy, but by not making what would amount to a gesture of goodwill—some kind of concession that would eradicate the feeling of insult, which those peoples undoubtedly do feel. It could be done possibly by the adoption of a quota system, which would allow in a limited number, without racial bias. I think that, despite certain mistakes, you can say that Australia is shedding her parochial attitude and that there has been a very real advance from the point of view of responsibility. If by "responsibility" you mean a willingness to bear a greater portion of your defence, a willingness to pay the cost and to share in the formulation of policy, then in all those directions there has been a very real advance.

In conclusion, let me say that there are two aspects of foreign policy: one is what you do abroad and the other, almost as important, is what you do at home. It is there, I think, that the Government has rather fallen down in its task of educating the community in relation to the enormously complex problems which confront it; but that, of course, is not solely the task of the Government. I feel that individuals who are interested in this matter have a very vital task to perform in this particular connection. At times it may become an unpopular task. They may have to stand up for certain principles that are not always in accordance with the national interest as the majority of their fellow citizens see it, but despite that I think that it is their function to provide a critical atmosphere of discussion for the conduct of all foreign policy.

*Mr. J. A. McCallum* agreed that Australia's foreign policy should be primarily concerned with Australia's vital interests. Australia could best hope to secure these interests by a close association with the other countries of the British Commonwealth and with the United States. He did not think that in any foreseeable time UNO would constitute a world government and that it should be regarded in the meantime as a limited liability body with certain definite, restricted functions, as an arbitrator and a forum of world opinion. In the long run the peace of the world would depend on the sense of justice of the dominant countries in the world as much as upon the operations of the United Nations. The most effective way in which Australian opinion could be brought to bear on world opinion was through the association of the British Commonwealth and not through unilateral and independent action at UNO.

*Mr. R. Windeyer* considered that some attention should have been given to the question of international trade as an important factor in shaping foreign policy. Another important factor was the geographical one that Australia was an appendage of Asia and in the event of a division into an eastern and a western bloc, Australia would be geographically in the eastern bloc and ideologically in the western.

*Mr. E. M. Higgins* thought that the logical conclusion of the theory that a country can pursue only such a foreign policy as it has the power to enforce would be that only the greatest power of all could justly presume to have a foreign policy. He felt that any State, however small, had a contribution to make to world councils if it spoke for justice and tolerance. There was still a very nice difference between the Australian political parties in regard to foreign policy, although this could only be applied to the leaders of the parties and not to the rank and file. Dr. Evatt could be taken to be following a distinctively Labour line in stressing Australia's independence of thought and action at UNO. Also the Opposition leaders in condemning Dr. Evatt's policy as creating discord between British Commonwealth members were following the traditional non-Labour attitude. The lack of interest in and knowledge of foreign affairs on the part of the rank and file of the parties and the general public were due to the Australian preoccupation with domestic issues and the fact that the governing parties had never attempted to interpret foreign issues in terms of their effect on domestic affairs.

*Mr. Vaidyanathan* said Australia was pursuing neither a long term nor a short term foreign policy, but merely a day to day policy. He was surprised at the omission of any reference to China, India and Indonesia. He thought Australia's foreign policy must inevitably take into consideration India, China and Soviet Russia as potential dominant powers in Asia. To disregard these Powers would be to have a foreign policy without any balanced provision for long range events.

*Mr. E. C. Masey* questioned the laying down of any set means whereby Australia would secure the enforcement of her foreign policy. While the aims of the policy would remain fixed, the means by which it was carried out would be dictated by expediency. He instanced Australia's traditional reliance on Great Britain and the appeal to America in 1942.

*Mr. W. H. Morrison* questioned whether the vital interests of a country could be summed up by saying that they were represented by a country's security. He thought that the interests of the

dominant social class in a country determined its foreign policy and instanced party interests in totalitarian States in the 20th century and commercial and industrial class interests in England in the 19th century as very definite factors in foreign policy.

The Chairman (*Professor J. Stone*) thought that the development of democratic government had to some extent facilitated the conduct of international affairs in a peaceful direction and increased the chances of adjustment. On the other hand, certain features of any democracy—instantaneous publicity, dependence of Foreign Ministers on electorates and the ignorance of many electors—were features of a democracy that sometimes hindered the pursuance of a consistent foreign policy by any democratic nation. One result was that what was said at international conferences was often for home consumption rather than directed to the best possible settlement of international differences.

With regard to Australian foreign policy he thought the apathy of Australian electors was largely due to the fact that what were claimed to be purely domestic issues were not placed in their right perspective before the public. Taking the simple matter of the budget which figured in the form of a taxation issue at the last election, anyone who was thinking about the defence of Australia either on a short term or a long term basis could fail to realise on the one hand that, insofar as defence was a part of foreign policy, the limitations of a possible budget now, and of a possible budget to be developed, were a vital factor. Conversely, if one was pursuing a certain kind of foreign policy one might have to make certain changes in the budget, which might influence even the rate at which income tax was lowered: a point that was not brought before electors by either party.

Another point that was directly entangled with this question of foreign policy was the whole matter of the balance of our economy. A particular foreign policy might involve for Australia, in her strategic role as a very important base in this area, the duty of moulding her peacetime industry and the allocation of manpower and resources between the primary industries and the manufacturing industries in the direction that would ensure that, at the appropriate time, we would have a basis that would be a good deal more satisfactory for the purposes of strategic security than it was in 1942. Immigration and External Territories policy were also matters that should be brought into their right perspective as regards foreign policy. Conditions of native labour, the level of health and technical skills among the population of New Guinea were most directly related to foreign policy because they were related to the

defence of territories that were by general admission the vital line of Australian defence.

*Dr. Greenwood* said he thought the world was still a world of power politics and rival blocs, and therefore a small country's liberty of action was in the last resort very small. He considered the class structure of a country to be less important now in foreign policy than previously. The rise of the proletariat in most States had had the effect of the governing class having to pay ransom to the working class to keep it more or less content. This meant the utilisation of State power for the satisfaction of certain basic interests of the proletariat and a consequent identification of the interests of the workers with the State or national interests.

He agreed on the enormous importance of India and China in relation to immigration, but felt that it was open to question whether there would be any solidarity of interest between India, China and Russia. He thought that on the long term view there would inevitably be a challenge to the assumptions underlying the "White Australia" policy and that a gesture at this stage would be at least more politic than to wait until the total abrogation of the policy was demanded and possibly forced on Australia.

# The Literature of the Pacific Islands

J. W. Davidson

For more than four centuries the Pacific Ocean has held the imagination of Western men. From the day, in September 1522, when the ship *Victoria* returned to Seville to tell of Ferdinand Magellan's successful crossing of the vast ocean, up to our own time, men have listened eagerly to the tales of returning travellers, pored over books and charts, and speculated wisely, or with abandon, upon the wealth, the beauty and the virtue to be found in the South Seas. Hundreds of writers well known in their own age—explorers and travellers; historians and geographers; poets and satirists; philosophers and theologians—have found their subject matter in the life, real or imagined, of the Pacific Islands. The narratives of Dampier, Anson, Bougainville and Cook became best-sellers; and histories and geographies, such as those of Charles de Brosses, John Callander and James Burney, found their way on to the library shelves of those who sought to keep in touch with their times. Imaginative writers, too, looked to the South Seas. For Swift, the Pacific became the region where Gulliver discovered Lilliput and Brobdingnag and Balnibarbi; for Rousseau, it was the home of the noble savage. In the nineteenth century, readers were carried to the islands by Pierre Loti's *Le Mariage de Loti*, by the stories of Herman Melville, by the tales and sketches and polemical writing of Robert Louis Stevenson. The Pacific had become a part of the educated European's inheritance.

The islands of Oceania, which are the subject of this article, have been the centre of this romantic popular interest. They are scattered over a huge area of ocean, stretching from the Carolines and New Guinea in the west to the Tuamotu Archipelago in the east, from Hawaii in the north to New Caledonia in the south. But in terms of land area, of population and of economic importance they are relatively insignificant. For example, there are to-day only about 1½ million Melanesians and Papuans, rather less than 300,000 Polynesians, and about 100,000 Micronesians; and the total population of the islands, including immigrants, is only about 2½ millions.

By contrast with the countries of Malaysia and of the continental shores of the Pacific the Oceanic islands are of small account: they form but a minute part of the Pacific World.

#### *General Works.*

The relative unimportance of the islands is reflected in the literature. Few of the publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations, for example, have dealt primarily, or at length, with Oceania; and there is a general lack of comprehensive studies. There is no satisfactory outline of the history of the islands, no full survey of physical or social anthropology or of native languages, no comparative study of governmental organisation. Bibliographies are few. It is impossible, therefore, to be brief in providing a guide such as this. Equally, it is impossible to avoid a somewhat arbitrary division of space. Many good books have been excluded where one general work with a bibliography provides an adequate introduction, while some bad books have been included from lack of an alternative.

The most useful, and till lately almost the sole, general work of reference is the *Pacific Islands Year-Book*, edited by R. W. Robson (5th edition, Sydney, 1944). This contains separate accounts of each island group, supplemented by a number of more general articles. It is, however, mainly concerned with those parts of the Pacific with which Australia has had strong political or economic links; and it deals very sketchily with other areas. A forerunner of the PIY, *Stewart's Handbook of the Pacific Islands* (Sydney, 1920), still remains useful, especially for the bibliography it contains. Recently, several general reference books have been published in the United States. In the main, they have drawn heavily upon the *Pacific Islands Year Book*. Perhaps the best of them is Hawthorne Daniel's *Islands of the Pacific* (New York, 1943). The most important event of the last few years, however, for the student of Pacific Islands affairs was the publication of Felix M. Keesing's *The South Seas in the Modern World* (New York, 1941; London, 1942). This book, which was written in the light of Dr. Keesing's long and varied experience of the Pacific, surveys the social, economic and political conditions of the islands at about the beginning of the 1939-45 war. It contains much useful statistical material and has a good bibliography. Every student of contemporary conditions will find himself constantly consulting it.

Detailed information on many topics is still obtainable only in various official publications. For some territories there are useful official handbooks. Examples are: *The Official Handbook of Papua* (Port Moresby, 1938); the *Official Handbook of the Territory of New Guinea* (Canberra, 1937); and *Fiji: Handbook of the*

Colony (Suva, 1941; special wartime issue, 1943). Most territories issue a report each year on the work of the government and on conditions generally. For example, there are: for Hawaii, the *Annual Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior* (Washington); for territories under the British Colonial Office, an *Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People* (London); and, for mandated territories, a *Report to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration*. In addition, there is a mass of departmental reports, blue books, etc., too large to be specified here, but, on the whole, easy to find. A month-by-month record of events is provided by several periodicals, of which the most important are *The Pacific Islands Monthly* (Sydney) and *L'Océanie Française, Bulletin Mensuel du Comité de l'Océanie Française* (Paris, appearing five times a year in the period just before the war). Much scientific material is contained in the publications of the Bernice P. Bishop Museum, Honolulu, and the Société des Etudes Océaniennes, Papeete.

For individual territories or groups of islands, there are a number of useful general books. The best of these are: S. W. Reed, *The Making of Modern New Guinea* (Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. XVIII, Philadelphia, 1943); Laura Thompson, *Guam and its People: a Study of Culture Change and Colonial Education* (Shanghai, 1941); A. F. Ellis, *Ocean Island and Nauru* (Sydney, 2nd edition, 1936); A. W. Lind, *An Island Community; Ecological Succession in Hawaii* (Chicago, 1938); F. M. Keesing, *Modern Samoa, Its Government and Changing Life* (London, 1934); and—for the islands of the central Pacific—E. H. Bryan, Jr., *American Polynesia and the Hawaiian Chain* (Honolulu, 1943). For Tonga, a reliable book is A. H. Wood's *History and Geography of Tonga* (Nuku'alofa, revised edition, 1938); but, as it is designed for use in schools, it is necessarily brief. Sir Hubert Murray's *Papua of To-day, or an Australian Colony in the Making* (London, 1925), is still useful, and has not been superseded by any more useful work of comparable scope. The best sources for the French territories are: S. Ferdinand-Lop, *Les Possessions Françaises du Pacifique* (Paris, 1933); W. G. Burchette, *Pacific Treasure Island; New Caledonia* (Melbourne, 1941); Samuel Russell, *Tahiti and French Oceania* (Sydney, 1935); and L. Rollin, *Les îles Marquises* (Paris, 1929). For the islands formerly administered by Japan under mandate, the most detailed work is T. Yanaihara's *Pacific Islands under Japanese Mandate* (Shanghai, 1939; London and New York, 1940). This is a curious and sometimes confused book, with a number of howlers, such as the observation that the islands lie "north and west of the equator" and the reference to "the great

English navigator Thomas Cook"; but it contains much useful material from Japanese official sources. Other recent books on these islands include: Paul M. Clyde, *Japan's Pacific Mandate* (New York, 1935); and two books by Willard Price—*Rip Tide in the South Seas* (Chicago, 1936) and *Japan's Islands of Mystery* (London, 1944). The fullest account of the New Hebrides is given by Tom Harrison, in *Savage Civilisation* (London, 1937); it is more vigorous than reliable. The most useful accounts of the Solomons are by S. G. C. Knibbs, *The Savage Solomons as They Were and Are* (London, 1929), and E. Paravicini, *Reisen in den britischen Salomonen* (Frauenfeld and Leipzig, 1931). There is no good general book on Fiji.

### *Physical Geography*

Much work by historians and social scientists has been rendered futile by ignorance of the geographical background, by lack of awareness of the physical factors which have defined and limited human activity. It therefore seems desirable to provide an introduction, even if necessarily brief, to the literature of Pacific geography. The most serviceable outline of the subject is G. L. Wood's *The Pacific Basin* (Oxford, 1930), which is simply and lucidly written: it deals with human as well as physical geography. The best book on physical geography is that of G. Schott, *Geographie des Indischen und Stillen Ozeans* (Hamburg, 1935). *The Pacific Ocean Handbook* (Stanford University, 1944), by E. G. Mears, provides a compact summary of present knowledge in a form designed to be useful to the traveller or navigator. Many valuable, but mainly rather technical articles, are to be found in the *Proceedings of the Congresses of the Pacific Scientific Association*.

An introduction to geology is provided by P. Marshall, 'Oceania,' *Handbuch der Regionalen Geologie*, Band VII, Heft. 9 (Heidelberg, 1911), and by L. J. Chubb, 'The Structure of the Pacific Basin,' *Geological Magazine*, Vol. LXXI, pp.289-302 (London, 1934). The best discussion of Pacific climates is that of G. Schott, 'Klimakunde der Südsee-Inseln,' *Handbuch der Klimatologie*, Band IV, Teil T (Berlin, 1938). Meteorological data will be found in the British Air Ministry Meteorological Office *Réseau Mondial* (London, annually). During the past three years it has become much easier to acquire some knowledge of the flora and fauna of the Pacific, as a result of the publication of the *Pacific World Series* under the auspices of the American Committee for International Wild Life Protection. There is an introductory volume: *The Pacific World*,

edited by Fairfield Osborn (New York, 1944). And this has been followed by a number of more specialised studies, published in New York in 1945-6: *Plant Life of the Pacific World*, by E. D. Merrill; *Mammals of the Pacific World*, by T. D. Carter, J. E. Hill, and G. H. H. Tate; *Reptiles of the Pacific World*, by Arthur Loveridge; *Fishes and Shells of the Pacific World*, by John T. Nichols and Paul Bartsch; and *Insects of the Pacific World*, by C. H. Curran. The books have bibliographies. Another work by E. D. Merrill, his 'Polynesian Botanical Bibliography, 1773-1935,' *Bernice P. Bishop Museum Bulletin*, no. 144 (Honolulu, 1937), lists several thousand books, papers, etc. on the botany of Polynesia and—despite its title—of Micronesia and of Melanesia as far west as New Caledonia. Three general books which are useful for the study of Pacific fauna are: F. S. Russell and C. M. Yonge, *The Seas* (London, 1928); W. B. Alexander, *Birds of the Ocean* (New York, 1928); and J. R. Norman, *Giant Fishes, Whales and Dolphins* (London, 1937). The most detailed work on corals is published in the *Great Barrier Reef Expedition, 1928-29, Scientific Reports* (London, 1930—).

### History

A very brief outline of the history of the Pacific Islands is contained in *The Cambridge History of the British Empire*, Vol. VII, Part i, *Australia* (Cambridge, 1933), which also has a useful bibliography. There is also much historical material in the Foreign Office *Peace Handbooks*, Vol. XXII (London, 1920). The nearest approach to a general history of the Pacific Islands is still Guy H. Scholefield's *The Pacific, Its Past and Future* (London, 1919). It has been the historian's primary resource since it was first published. But it has weaknesses as a general history: it is concerned mainly with politics and diplomacy, in a field where it is indispensable to understand social trends; it makes too little use of non-British sources; and it is a study of particular problems and individual island groups, rather than a general synthesis. The student will soon find it necessary to turn to more specialised historical works—or, often, to the original sources.

The historian of the Pacific has not, at least until recently, been well provided with periodicals in which to publish shorter studies. Specialist articles are not numerous and are widely scattered. A high proportion of the useful work of this kind has been published, however, in three periodicals: the *Pacific Historical Review* (Berkeley and Los Angeles); the *Hawaiian Historical Society: Annual Report* (Honolulu); and the *Royal Australian Historical Society, Journal and Proceedings* (Sydney).

An admirable study of Polynesian migrations, and of the condition of the islands before the coming of Europeans, has been made by Sir Peter Buck in *Vikings of the Sunrise* (New York, 1938). The period of European exploration, from Magellan to Cook, has also been fully and perceptively covered—in J. C. Beaglehole's *The Exploration of the Pacific* (London, 1934). This has recently been supplemented by L. C. Wroth's *The Early Cartography of the Pacific* (published originally in *Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2, 1944; reprinted in a limited edition, New York, 1944). Both Wroth's essay and the accompanying reproductions of maps are first-class. Many of the original journals and narratives of the explorers have been published, most of these have been translated into English, and, when modern editions have been prepared, useful editorial matter has generally been added. Dr. Beaglehole, in his book, gives a short bibliography of the subject, which is an adequate guide to further reading. A number of works have been published since he wrote, including: a new edition (by J. A. Williamson) of William Dampier's *A Voyage to New Holland* (London, 1939); G. E. Nunn, 'Magellan's Route in the Pacific,' *Geographical Review*, Vol. XXIV, pp. 615-33 (New York, 1934); Stefan Zweig, *Magellan, Pioneer of the Pacific* (London, 1938); Hugh Carrington, *Life of Captain Cook* (London, 1939); J. C. Beaglehole, *The Discovery of New Zealand* (Wellington, 1939); and *Abel Janszoon Tasman and the Discovery of New Zealand* (Wellington, 1942). The intricate story of discovery in the Micronesian islands is summarised in W. E. Safford's 'Useful Plants of the Island of Guam; with an introductory account of . . . the character and history of its people,' *Contributions from the United States National Herbarium*, Vol. IX (Washington, 1905). Dr. J. A. Williamson, in *The Ocean in English History* (Oxford, 1941), places the English share in Pacific exploration in its relation to English expansion in other parts of the world.

The age of major exploration in the Pacific came to an end with the death of Captain Cook in Hawaii in 1779. In his three triumphant voyages Cook had solved most of the great problems which geographers had been discussing when he first sailed for the Pacific less than eleven years before. Within a few years of his death whalers, traders and missionaries were active among the world of islands which he and his predecessors had revealed to Western eyes. Till the middle of the nineteenth century, they were the principal agents of European penetration of the Pacific. The economic and social history of the islands, however, is still largely unpublished, so that it is necessary to study the period mainly from contemporary sources. For the latter half of the century, when the political

interests and responsibilities of Western Powers became much greater, there is a fair amount of useful secondary material.

The diplomatic history of the islands up to 1875 is covered by Miss J. I. Brookes's *International Rivalry in the Pacific Islands, 1800-1875* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1941). This is based on wide study of the sources, but its interpretations are not always reliable. It may be supplemented by the following works dealing with more limited fields: for Tahiti, C. A. Vincendon-Dumoulin and C. Desgraz, *Îles Taiti* (Paris, 1844); for Samoa, G. H. Ryden, *The Foreign Policy of the United States in Relation to Samoa* (New Haven, 1933), Sylvia Masterman, *The Origins of International Rivalry in Samoa, 1845-1884* (London, 1934), and J. W. Ellison, *Opening and Penetration of Foreign Influence in Samoa to 1880* (Corvallis, Oregon, 1938); for New Guinea, A. C. V. Melbourne, "The Relations between Australia and New Guinea, up to the establishment of British rule in 1888," *Royal Australian Historical Society, Journal and Proceedings*, vol. XII, pp.288-314, vol. XIII, pp.145-72 (Sydney, 1926-27, 1927-28); for the New Hebrides, A. Brunet, *Le Régime international des nouvelles-Hébrides* (Paris, 1908), and E. Jacomb, *France and England in the New Hebrides* (Melbourne, 1914).

For particular island groups there are, in a few cases, general histories. Hawaii is well covered by: R. S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1778-1854: Foundation and Transformation* (Honolulu, 1938); H. W. Bradley, *The American Frontier in Hawaii: the Pioneers, 1789-1843* (Stanford University, 1942); and Jean Hobbs, *Hawaii, a Pageant of the Soil* (Stanford University, 1936). A more elementary work is R. S. Kuykendall's *A History of Hawaii* (New York, 1927). A detailed and reliable *History of Fiji* is being written by R. A. Derrick. Volume I, covering the period up to 1874, has recently been published in Suva. The history of New Caledonia up to 1884 has been written by C. Savoie, *Histoire de la Nouvelle-Calédonie et de ses Dépendances* (Noumea, 1922), and there is a more recent "popular" outline by H. E. L. Priday, *Cannibal Island: the Turbulent Story of New Caledonia's Cannibal Coasts* (Wellington, 1944).

There are few works of value on the economic development of the islands—not even on the history of "blackbirding"—except for a few articles in the periodicals listed above. A useful article recently published elsewhere is Eric Ramsden's "William Stewart and the Introduction of Chinese Labour in Tahiti, 1864-74," *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, Vol. LV, pp.187-214 (Wellington, 1946). There is a general survey of whaling by W.

J. Dakin, *Whalemen Adventurers: the Story of Whaling in Australian Waters and other Southern Seas* (Sydney, 1934).

In contrast to the lack of historical studies, there is a great wealth of contemporary descriptions covering the whole of the nineteenth century. There is space here only to single out a few works from the hundreds which repay study. Many of the most important books are the records of naval expeditions, some of them concerned with scientific work, others with political duties. Outstanding examples are: *the Narrative of the Surveying Voyages of H.M. Ships Adventure and Beagle*, Vol. II (Robert FitzRoy, *Proceedings of the Second Expedition, 1831-1836*), Vol. III (Charles Darwin, *Journals and Remarks, 1832-1836*) (London, 1839); J. S. C. Dumont d'Urville, *Voyage au Pole Sud et dans l'Océanie sur les corvettes L'Astrolabe et La Zélée, exécuté par ordre du Roi pendant les années 1837-1839-1840 . . . Histoire du Voyage*, 10 vols. and atlas (Paris, 1842-46); Charles Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition during the years 1838-1842*, 5 vols. and atlas (London, 1845); J. E. Erskine, *Journal of a Cruise among the Islands of the Western Pacific* (London, 1853); and John Moresby, *Discoveries and Surveys in New Guinea and the D'Entrecasteaux Islands. A Cruise in Polynesia and Visits to the Pearl-shelling Stations in Torres Straits* (London, 1876). Two books on naval cruises which are worth including as being among the better sources for the "blackbirding" trade are: George Palmer, *Kidnapping in the South Seas, being a Narrative of a Three Months' Cruise of H.M. Ship Rosario* (Edinburgh, 1871); and A. H. Markham, *The Cruise of the "Rosario" . . . exposing the recent atrocities connected with the kidnapping of natives in the South Seas* (London, 1873). An important gap has recently been filled in the literature of the early days of the century by the translation from Russian into English of *The Voyage of Captain Bellingshausen to the Antarctic Seas, 1819-1821* (edited by Frank Debenham; 2 vols., *Hakluyt Society Publications*, 2nd series, nos. XCI-XCII, London, 1945).

Among the most useful books written by persons engaged in trade or agriculture among the Pacific Islands are: J. A. Moerenhout, *Voyages aux îles du Grand Océan . . . , 2 vols.* (Paris, 1837); (E. Lucett), *Rovings in the Pacific from 1837 to 1849 . . . , 2 vols.* (London, 1851); Andrew Cheyne, *A Description of Islands in the Western Pacific Ocean, North and South of the Equator* (London, 1852); F. J. Moss, *Through Atolls and Islands in the Great South Sea* (London, 1889); and Dora Hort, *Tabiti, the Garden of the Pacific* (London, 1891). *The Journal of William Lockerby, Sandal-*

*wood Trader in the Fijian Islands during the Years 1808-1809*, edited by E. im Thurn and L. C. Wharton (*Hakluyt Society Publications*, 2nd series, No. LII, London, 1925), provides a full history of sandalwood trading in Fiji up to 1815.

The history of missionary activity is much more fully covered than almost any other aspect of the subject. Two useful works are: W. P. Morrell, 'The Transition to Christianity in the South Pacific,' *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 4th series, Vol. XXVIII, pp.101-120 (London, 1946); and Peter H. Buck, *Anthropology and Religion* (New Haven, 1939); K. L. P. Martin's *Missionaries and Annexation in the Pacific* (London, 1924), is a readable essay, but it contains many glaring inaccuracies due to its author's lack of general acquaintance with Pacific affairs. The missionary organisations themselves have sponsored the publication of many books. The worst of them show a lack of objectivity rarely equalled elsewhere; the best are very good. Among the most useful general works are: R. Lovett, *The History of the London Missionary Society*, 1795-1895, 2 vols. (London, 1899); G. C. Findlay and W. W. Holdsworth, *The History of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society*, 5 vols. (London, 1921-24); E. S. Armstrong, *The History of the Melanesian Mission* (London, 1900); J. Colwell (editor), *A Century in the Pacific* (London, 1914); and F. S. H. Young, *Pearls from the Pacific* (London, 1925). Good biographies include Le Rev. Père Mangaret, *Mgr. Bataillon et les Missions de l'Océanie Centrale*, 2 vols. (new edition, Lyons, 1895); H. W. Tucker, *Life and Episcopate of George Augustus Selwyn*, 2 vols. (London, 1879); and C. M. Yonge, *Life of John Coleridge Patteson*, 2 vols. (London, 1874). Missionaries themselves have written many books, of which some have come to be regarded as classics. Among the best are: William Ellis, *Polynesian Researches . . .*, 2 vols. (London, 1829); John Williams, *A Narrative of Missionary Enterprises in the South Sea Islands* (London, 1837); J. G. Paton, *An Autobiography* (5th edition, London, 1894); and George Brown, *An Autobiography* (London, 1908).

In addition to works mentioned above, the following are useful for the period of "the partition of Oceania" (i.e. the years from 1875 till 1906: Paul Deschanel, *Les Intérêts français dans l'Océan Pacifique* (Paris, 1888); Henri Russier *Le Partage de l'Océanie* (Paris, 1905); S. H. Roberts, *History of French Colonial Policy 1870-1925*, 2 vols. (London, 1929); P. E. Quinn, 'The Diplomatic Struggle for the Carolines, 1898,' *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. XII, pp.339-50 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1943).

A fine account of the labour trade in its later phases is given by W. T. Wawn (who was himself engaged in it for many years) in his book, *The South Sea Islanders and the Queensland Labour Trade 1875-1891* (London, 1893). One of the best accounts of trading in the Pacific in the present century is J. H. C. Dickinson's *A Trader in the Savage Solomons* (London, 1927). A vigorous narrative dealing with the last years of Hawaiian independence is that of Mary H. Krout, *Hawaii and a Revolution* (London, 1898). Among secondary works dealing with more recent times three deserve mention here: Lewis Lett's *The Papuan Achievement* (Melbourne, 1942); S. W. Reed's *The Making of Modern New Guinea* (Philadelphia, 1943) and S. K. Stevens's *American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842-1898* (Harrisburg, Pa., 1945).

#### *Population and Health Conditions*

Few general demographic surveys have been made in the Pacific Islands. Research has nearly always been primarily concerned with the problem of native depopulation. The most useful studies of population are: W. H. R. Rivers (editor), *Essays on the Depopulation of Melanesia* (Cambridge, 1922); S. H. Roberts, *Population Problems of the Pacific* (London, 1927); G. H. L-F. Pitt-Rivers, *The Clash of Cultures and the Contact of Races* (London, 1927); R. R. Kuczynski, *Colonial Population* (London, 1937); S. M. Lambert, 'The Depopulation of Pacific Races,' *Bernice P. Bishop Museum Special Publication*, no. 23 (Honolulu, 1934); A. W. Lind, *An Island Community* (Chicago, 1938); and two books by Romanzo Adams, *The Peoples of Hawaii* (Honolulu, 1933), and *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii* (New York, 1937). There are a number of works dealing with depopulation in particular areas, including: the Colony of Fiji, *Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the Decrease of the Native Population, with Appendices* (Suva, 1896); P. A. Buxton, 'The Depopulation of the New Hebrides and Other Parts of Melanesia,' *Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene*, Vol. XIX, pp.419-54 (London, 1926); J. R. Baker, 'Depopulation in Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides,' *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. LVIII, pp.279-303 (London, 1928); R. W. Cilento, *The Causes of Depopulation of the Western Islands of the Territory of New Guinea* (Canberra, 1928); H. I. Hogbin, 'The Problem of Depopulation as Applied to Ongtong Java (Solomon Islands),' *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, Vol. XXXIX, pp.43-66 (Wellington, 1930); F. E. Williams, 'Depopulation of the Suau District,' *Territory of Papua, Anthropology, Report*, no. 13 (Port Moresby, 1933); and several articles in *Oceania* (Sydney) during 1932-33.

Information on health conditions in the Pacific can be obtained from the official reports of the various administrations and from the *Annual Supplement to the Tropical Diseases Bulletin* (London). The technical literature of the subject is scattered through a bewildering number of journals. But useful general references are: F. W. O'Connor, 'Researches in the Western Pacific,' *Research Memoirs of the London School of Tropical Medicine* (London, 1923); P. A. Buxton, 'Researches in Polynesia and Melanesia,' *London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Memoir No. 2* (London, 1829); S. M. Lambert, 'Medical Conditions in the South Pacific,' *Medical Journal of Australia*, 15th year, Vol. II, pp. 362-79 (Sydney, 1928); P. Hermant and R. W. Cilento, *Report on Health Conditions in the Pacific Islands* (Geneva, 1929); and *Conference of Far Eastern Countries on Rural Hygiene. Preparatory Paper* (Geneva, 1937). There is much interesting discussion of health matters and medical work in Dr. S. M. Lambert's autobiographical volume, *A Doctor in Paradise* (London, 1942).

### *Physical Anthropology*

The most important general source is A. C. Haddon's *The Races of Man and their Distribution* (revised edition, Cambridge, 1929). In addition, there are useful studies by R. L. Sullivan, H. L. Schapiro and P. H. Buck in the Bernice P. Bishop Museum *Memoirs* (Honolulu); by Schapiro and W. W. Howells in the *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History*, Vols. XXXIII-XXXIV (New York, 1933); and by Schapiro and Howells in 'Studies in the Anthropology of Oceania and Asia' (edited by Carleton S. Coon and James M. Andrews IV), *Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University*, Vol. XX (Cambridge, Mass., 1943).

### *Languages*

There are two general studies of Melanesian languages: R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesian Languages* (Oxford, 1885); and S. H. Ray, *The Melanesian Island Languages* (Cambridge, 1926). Useful, also, for a more limited field, is A. Capell's article, 'Language Study for New Guinea Students,' *Oceania*, Vol. XI, pp. 40-74 (Sydney, 1940-41). A number of articles on the languages of Polynesia have been published in the *Journal of the Polynesian Society* (Wellington); and some material on those of Micronesia is contained in the volumes published by the Hamburg Museum and edited by G. Thilenius—*Ergebnisse der Südsee-Expedition, 1908-1910, II (Ethnographie)* (Hamburg, various dates). A recent book on pidgin Eng-

lish is Robert A. Hall, Jr., *Melanesian Pidgin English Grammar, Texts, Vocabulary* (*Special Publications of the Linguistic Society of America*, Baltimore, 1943).

### Social Anthropology

There is no comprehensive work on the social anthropology of the Pacific. The whole area is covered, briefly and for "the general reader," in Felix M. Keesing's *Native Peoples of the Pacific World* (New York, 1946) and also by the *Smithsonian Institution War Background Studies*, nos. 6, 9, and 16 (Washington, 1943)—*Polynesians, Explorers of the Pacific*, by J. E. Weckler; *The Native Peoples of New Guinea*, by M. W. Stirling; and *Island Peoples of the Western Pacific*.

For Polynesia, an excellent introduction is provided by Sir Peter Buck (Te Rangi Hiroa)'s recently published work, 'An Introduction to Polynesian Anthropology,' *Bernice P. Bishop Museum Bulletin*, no. 187 (Honolulu, 1945). It has full bibliographies. The ancient culture of Polynesia is dealt with: by Peter H. Buck, *Vikings of the Sunrise* (New York, 1938); by H. L. Schapiro and others, 'Polynesian Anthropological Studies,' *Memoirs of the Polynesian Society*, Vol. XVIII (New Plymouth, 1941); and in various books by, or compiled from the notes of, R. W. Williamson. Good accounts of modern Polynesian peoples include: Felix M. Keesing, *Modern Samoa* (London, 1934); E. Beaglehole, *Some Modern Hawaiians* (Honolulu, 1937); and E. and P. Beaglehole, 'Pangai, Village in Tonga,' *Memoirs of the Polynesian Society*, Vol. XVIII (Wellington, 1941). These may usefully be compared with two recent studies of the Maori people: I. L. G. Sutherland (editor), *The Maori People To-day: a General Survey* (Wellington, 1940); and E. and P. Beaglehole, *Some Modern Maoris* (Wellington, 1946).

There is no general work on Micronesia. A great deal of material will be found in the relevant volumes of the Hamburg Museum series edited by G. Thilenius: *Ergebnisse der Südsee-Expedition, 1908-1910, II (Ethnographie)*, B (Mikronesien) (Hamburg, various dates). Laura Thompson has written a good book on a modern Micronesian people: *Guam and Its People* (Shanghai, 1941).

The best general works on Melanesia are R. H. Codrington's *The Melanesians, Their Anthropology and Folklore* (Oxford, 1891) and C. G. Seligman's *The Melanesians of British New Guinea* (Cambridge, 1910). W. Deane's *Fijian Society, or the Sociology and Psychology of the Fijians* (London, 1921) is still useful for Fiji. There are several good studies of modern Melanesian communities, including: H. I. Hogbin, *Experiments in Civilization* (London,

1939); Laura Thompson, *Fijian Frontier* (San Francisco, 1940); and W. R. Geddes, 'Deuba; a Study of a Fijian Village,' *Memoirs of the Polynesian Society*, Vol. XXII (Wellington, 1945).

Much has been written on the material culture of the peoples of the Pacific Islands. Among the most comprehensive works are: A. C. Haddon, 'The Decorative Art of British New Guinea,' *Royal Irish Academy, Cunningham Memoirs*, no. 10 (Dublin, 1894); A. C. Haddon and James Hornell, 'Canoes of Oceania,' 3 vols., *Bernice P. Bishop Museum Special Publication*, nos. 27-9 (Honolulu, 1936-8); and Raymond Firth, *Art and Life in New Guinea* (London and New York, 1936). Sir Peter Buck (Te Rangi Hiroa) has also written several volumes on the material culture of the Samoans and the Cook Islanders, as well as on that of the Maoris of New Zealand.

More specialised works on native peoples, are, of course, numerous, for social anthropology has reached a higher point during recent years than any other branch of Pacific studies. As a consequence, anthropological literature is fairly readily accessible. Recent books are duly reviewed in *Oceania* (Sydney), *The Journal of the Polynesian Society* (Wellington), and other anthropological journals; and earlier books and articles are listed in the bibliographies to later studies.

Relatively few books or articles have been devoted to systematic study of non-native communities in the Pacific. Two useful works, primarily economic in emphasis, on Hawaii are: J. W. Coulter and Chde-Kwon Chun, *Chinese Rice Farmers in Hawaii* (Honolulu, 1937); and Edna C. Wentworth, *Filipino Plantation Workers in Hawaii* (New York, 1941). Andrew Lind's forthcoming book on *The Japanese in Hawaii* (Princeton University Press) will be an important addition to this list. J. W. Coulter has also produced an interesting, though disappointingly slight, study of the Fiji Indian community: *Fiji, Little India of the Pacific* (Chicago, 1942). Two earlier books also give valuable descriptions of the problems and way of life of the Fiji Indians: J. W. Burton's *The Fiji of To-day* (London, 1910) and C. F. Andrews's *India and the Pacific* (London, 1937). There is a good deal of information on the Indo-Chinese in New Caledonia and the New Hebrides in various issues of *L'Océanie Française* (see above, page 65). European groups in the islands have been little studied; but, since so much has been written by European residents themselves and as their point of view is generally reflected in local newspapers, the lack is less serious than it would otherwise be. A greater misfortune is the lack of studies of the growing mixed-blood communities of the islands. In Hawaii, these

groups have been studied by Romanzo Adams (see above, page 72); and in Fiji some work has been done by government officers and published in the *Journal of the Legislative Council* (Suva, annually). Even in these territories only a beginning has been made. In most other areas there is almost no detailed information available.

### Government

The study of government in Pacific Islands territories has been greatly neglected. The student in search of detailed information has generally to go to the annual reports and other publications of the individual governments (see above, pages 64, 65). Knowledge of the broad outlines of island government can often be gained from more general works. For territories administered by Great Britain, Sir Charles Jeffries's *The Colonial Empire and its Civil Service* (Cambridge, 1938) are both useful. For the French territories, there is much material in: A. Girault, *Principles de colonisation et de législation coloniale*, 4 vols (5th-6th edition, Paris, 1927-33); Louis Rolland and others, *Législation et finances coloniales* (Paris, 1930); P. Dareste, *Traité de droit colonial*, 2 vols, (Paris, 1931); and S. Ferdinand-Lop, *Les possessions françaises du Pacifique* (Paris, 1933). A useful general work on American possessions is W. H. Haas (editor), *The American Empire* (Chicago, 1940).

For studies of government in its local setting—social, economic and political—it is necessary to go to works on particular territories. The most important, from this point of view, are: R. M. C. Littler, *The Governance of Hawaii: a Study in Territorial Administration* (Stanford University, 1929); Felix M. Keesing, *Modern Samoa* (London, 1934); T. Yanaihara, *Pacific Islands under Japanese Mandate* (Shanghai, 1939; London and New York, 1940); Laura Thompson, *Guam and its People* (Shanghai, 1941); Laura Thompson, *Fijian Frontier* (San Francisco, 1940); H. I. Hogbin, *Experiments in Civilization* (London, 1939); and S. W. Reed, *The Making of Modern New Guinea* (Philadelphia, 1943). A number of earlier works by writers who themselves made important contributions to the development of Pacific governments are still useful. Such are: for Fiji and the Western Pacific High Commission—Sir Arthur Gordon, *Fiji, Records of Private and Public Life, 1875-80*, 4 vols. (Edinburgh, printed for private circulation, 1897-1910), Sir G. W. Des Voeux, *My Colonial Service*, 2 vols. (London, 1903), and G. Alexander, *From the Middle Temple to the South Seas* (London, 1927); for Fiji alone—Sir Everard im Thurn, 'Fiji as a Crown Colony,' *Quarterly Review*, Vol. CCXVI, pp.55-78 (London, 1912); for Tonga—Sir Basil Thompson, *The Diversions of*

*a Prime Minister* (Edinburgh and London, 1894); and for Papua—two books by Sir Hubert Murray, *Papua, or British New Guinea*, (London, 1912) and *Papua of To-day* (London, 1925).

More specialised studies are few. In the field of law, a high standard is set by Sir Robert Garran's article on 'The Law of the Territories of the Commonwealth,' *Australian Law Journal*, Vol. IX, supp. pp. 28-42 (Sydney, etc., 1935-36). Also useful is an article by J. A. Todd, 'Native Offences and European Law in South-west New Britain', *Oceania*, Vol. V, pp. 437-60 (Sydney, 1934-35). Colonial law, in the Pacific as in Africa and other colonial regions, is a subject more than ripe for study. Tackled in the right way—by students with the requisite legal knowledge, plus broad sociological interests—it should prove very fruitful; and it would open the way to many other needful investigations. A little has been written on systems of native administration in the Pacific. There is some material in books such as those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; and one or two papers have been written—among them two by H. I. Hogbin stand out: 'Native Councils and Native Courts in the Solomon Islands,' *Oceania*, Vol. XIV pp. 257-83 (Sydney), 1943-4), and 'Local Government for New Guinea,' (*ibid.*, Vol. XVII, pp. 38-65, Sydney, 1946-47). Compared with the extensive research done on the subject in other parts of the world, this represents only a tardy beginning.

The one branch of government, or of social services, which has been at all fully studied is education. A general survey of the field is given by Felix M. Keesing in *Education in Pacific Countries* (London, 1938). The position in territories under the British Colonial Office is outlined by Arthur Mayhew, *Education in the Colonial Empire* (London, 1938). Other useful works include: A. P. Elkin, 'Education of Native Races in Pacific Countries,' *Oceania*, Vol. VII, pp. 145-68 (Sydney, 1936-37); T. B. Strong, 'New Zealand and South Sea Island Education,' *Year-book of Education* (London, 1933); C. W. Mann, *Education in Fiji* (Melbourne, 1935); W. G. Groves, *Native Education and Culture Contact in New Guinea: a Scientific Approach* (Melbourne, 1936). There are chapters on education in Western Samoa and the Cook Islands in a symposium edited by P. M. Jackson: *The Maori and Education* (Wellington, 1931).

#### *Economics*

Very little work has so far been done on the economics of the Pacific Islands. There are chapters on economic matters in many of the general works on particular territories listed above (see

pages 65-66); and a few of the books listed under *Social Anthropology* contain much economic material. But there are few comprehensive accounts. For this reason, the relatively brief outline, supplemented by statistical material, in Felix M. Keesing's *The South Seas in the Modern World* (New York, 1941; London, 1942) is specially valuable, and the out-dated Australian Inter-State Commission 'Report on British and Australian Trade in the South Pacific,' *Commonwealth Parliamentary Paper*, 1917-18, no. 66 (Melbourne, 1918), is still useful. Outside these accounts, statistical material is to be found mainly in the blue books and other publications of the local governments, and in various handbooks and periodicals. The most important of these were, up to 1939: *The Statistical Year-book of the League of Nations* (Geneva, annually); and, for the parts of the Pacific covered, the British Colonial Office, *An Economic Survey of the Colonial Empire* (1937) (London, 1940), the French *Annuaire de Commerce Didot-Bottin* (Paris, annually), and—for the islands formerly administered by Japan—*The Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book* (Tokyo, 1934-40). Particulars of mining development are given in the U.S. Department of Mines, *Minerals Yearbook* (Washington, annually), and in *Quin's Metal Handbook* (edited by F. B. Rice-Oxley, London, annually).

*The Pacific Islands Monthly* and *L'Océanie Francaise* (for both, see above, page 65) also contain much economic information).

More specialised studies are scattered and scanty, and can most easily be traced through the bibliographies in books on particular regions. A few works which are perhaps worth mentioning here are: two studies by J. W. Coulter, *Land Utilization in the Hawaiian Islands* (Honolulu, 1933), and 'Land Utilization in American Samoa,' *Bernice P. Bishop Museum Bulletin*, no. 170 (Honolulu, 1941); U.S. Department of Labour, 'Labour in the Territory of Hawaii, 1939,' *Bulletin* no. 687 (Washington, 1940); J. Alvin Decker, *Labor Problems in the Pacific Mandates* (New York, 1940); and J. S. Phillips, *Cocoanut Quest* (London, 1940), dealing with diseases affecting the copra industry.

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To the general reader (if any such has persisted so far), this survey may have seemed almost intolerably weighed down with references to books and articles—many of them, unfortunately, not easily accessible outside major libraries. Yet, to the student of the Pacific, its omissions will have been equally apparent. Whole classes of books have been ignored. There are books, for example, which are not specifically about the Pacific, but which can illuminate some aspect of Pacific affairs. No one who has read Harold Gatty's *The*

*Raft Book*—to take one instance—could happily see it omitted. Mr. Gatty's primary concern in this work is to provide guidance for airmen or mariners cast adrift at sea in small boats or on rafts; but, as he applies his great knowledge of Polynesian navigational methods and ocean lore to the problem in hand, his readers almost inevitably begin to feel themselves drawn closer in spirit to the canoe voyagers who traversed the Pacific Ocean many centuries ago.

Or, again, modern narratives of travel or of residence in the islands have not been touched on. Some are very good, and they serve a purpose which works of scholarship or scientific treatises almost necessarily fail to do: they give, more or less directly, an impression of what the South Seas had meant to their authors—they communicate the "feel" of the Islands. No one who is interested in the recent history of Melanesia, for example, can afford to ignore R. J. Fletcher's brilliant, anonymous book *Isles of Illusion*, which records his life—with its hopes and frustrations; its friendships and hates—in the New Hebrides. Similarly, the student of anthropology should not neglect Ernest Beaglehole's *Islands of Danger*, which describes the daily life of the author and his wife during a period of field-work. But the difficulty in the way of including books of this sort is their great number. It has seemed best to leave it to the individual reader to browse through the rows of books on library shelves and to make his own occasional, exciting discoveries. In any case, this article has not aimed at being more than an introduction to the huge literature of the Pacific Islands. If it guides students to parts of the field they do not know, it will have served the purpose for which it was written.

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